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"The Mis-Characterization of the Negro":t A Race Critique
of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule
MONTR D. CARODINE"
The election of Barack Obama as the nation's first Black President was a
watershed moment with respect to race relations in the United States. Obama's
election removed what to many seemed a nearly insurmountable racial barrier. Yet as
he transitions into his historic role and his family becomes the first Black occupants of
the White House, scores of Blacks are housed in jails and prisons across the country.
The mass incarceration ofBlacks, among other serious issues, demonstrates that race
still matters in the United States. As then-presidential candidate Obama acknowledged
in the speech that many viewed to be pivotal in his campaign, race is still an issue in
this country, an issue that we cannot afford to ignore. Obama's words ring true
particularly in the area of criminal justice. Indeed, several months before Obama's
speech on race, the "Jena Six" case, which sparked what many are calling the new
civil rights movement, reminded us that the criminal justice system is still a two-tiered
system that is, in many ways, racially biased. The system and society at large have
criminalized the very fact of being Black. The construction of Black criminality is
facilitated in the justice system largely through racially biased rules.
This Article critiques one such rule-the deeply entrenched evidentiary rule that
allows prosecutors to impeach the credibility of criminal defendants with their prior
convictions. This Article demonstrates that the prior conviction impeachment rule
gives evidentiary value to race through its reliance on a criminal justice system that
imposes the "Black tax, " an unjustified disadvantage to Blacks, and granting the
"White credit," an undeserved benefit to Whites. This Article argues that prior
convictions are therefore unreliable hearsay. Though scholars have condemned the
prior conviction impeachment rule because of the grave potential that jurors will
misuse the convictions as evidence of criminal defendants' guilt, they have merely
assumed, without analysis, that prior convictions are inherently reliable. Prior
convictions fit the classic definition of hearsay. The rule that provides for their
admissibility exists as an exception to the rule against hearsay only because
convictions are deemed inherently reliable. The presumption of reliability stems from
the fact that the convictions are pronouncements from other courts.
t The title of this Article is based on CARTER G. WOODSON, THE MIs-EDUCATION OF THE
NEGRO (AMS Press 1977) (1933).
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Scholars have critiqued the prior conviction rule as if it operates in a race neutral
manner. This Article challenges the notion that prior convictions are inherently
reliable, arguing that the mounting evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice
system renders prior convictions so unreliable that they raise serious due process
concerns for criminal defendants. This Article also offers solutions. Congress and
state legislatures should eliminate the use of prior convictions against criminal
defendants. Unless or until there is legislative intervention, courts should require
prosecutors to establish the reliability of the convictions that they offer for
impeachment and also allow defendants to "impeach" the credibility of the criminal
justice system, which is the hearsay "declarant. "
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INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to expose and eliminate the racially biased operation of Rule 609
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides for impeachment of criminal
defendants with their prior convictions.
The election of Barack Obama as the nation's first Black President removed what to
many seemed a nearly insurmountable racial barrier. Yet, as he transitions into his
historic role and his family becomes the first Black family to occupy the White House,
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scores of Blacks are housed in jails and prisons across the country. It might be
suggested that the election of a Black President means that we have moved into a post-
racial society, one in which race simply does not matter.' But the mass incarceration of
Blacks, among many other issues, demonstrates that race remains one of the major
issues in the United States. As one commentator aptly observed the day after the
momentous election of Obama, "the larger reality is the profound disparity between
[B]lack and [W]hite Americans that will persist even under the glow of an Obama
presidency." 2 In a sense, it is the best of times and the worst of times. Instead of a post-
racial society, at which we have not arrived, today we find ourselves in a transitioning-
racial society. We have a Black President, but race still matters.
Indeed, under fire after the widespread circulation of his former pastor's sermons,
then-presidential candidate Obama was forced to deal with the issue of race, an issue
that he largely managed to avoid in the earlier part of his campaign for the Democratic
Party's nomination. In a poignant speech in which he denounced his former Black
pastor's racially charged and purportedly divisive statements, Obama also readily
acknowledged that "race is an issue that I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore
right now." 3 In the area of criminal justice, those words ring particularly true. Indeed,
only a few short months before Obama's powerful speech, the notorious case of the
"Jena Six" sparked what many have called the new civil rights movement. In that case,
five members of a group of six Black Louisiana teens were charged as adults with
attempted murder for what many people viewed as a school-yard-type fight with a
White teen. The case garnered international media attention and "became a call to
action for activists on the Internet and college campuses, who saw it as proof that
[B]lack youths in America still face a double standard in the American legal system."5
The fight occurred after several race-related incidents involving school children in the
small town of Jena, Louisiana.6 The incidents began when White teens hung nooses
from what was considered a "White only" tree after a Black freshman indicated that he
would like to sit there. The White students who hung the nooses received three days'
suspension; and White students involved in off-campus "racially charged" fights were
given "minimal punishment."'
The sentiment among many across the country was that there was blatantly unfair
and disproportionate treatment of the Black teens, dubbed the "Jena Six." In a
1. See Shelby Steele, Op-Ed., Obama Seduced Whites with a Vision of Their Racial
Innocence Precisely to Coerce Them into Acting Out of a Racial Motivation, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2008, at A3 1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-steele5-
2008nov05,0,6553798.story.
2. Id.
3. Senator Barack Obama, Presidential Candidate, Democratic Party, Speech on Race in
Philadelphia (Mar. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/l 8/obama.transcript/index.html [hereinafter Obama
speech].
4. Reed Walters, Op-Ed., Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A27.
5. Miguel Bustillo, 'Jena Six' Teenager Is Freed on Bail, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at
A10.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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remarkable scene, reminiscent of the civil rights days of the 1960s, more than 20,000
people descended upon Jena, Louisiana, from all over the country to protest the
perceived disparate treatment of the Black teens in the criminal justice system.9 The
Jena Six case was symbolic of the much larger problem of race and the criminal justice
system. The case was reflective of the unfair treatment of Blacks in the criminal justice
system as a whole across the country. This unfair treatment has historical roots and
persists today, largely perpetuated by racially biased rules of law. This Article deals
with one of those rules: the deeply entrenched evidentiary rule providing for the
admissibility of prior felony convictions to attack the credibility of witnesses. If we are
to move from our current state of race relations toward a truly post-racial society, we
must reexamine rules like the prior conviction impeachment rule and eliminate this and
other rules that have the power to perpetuate racial injustice.
Under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar state versions of the
rule, an accused in a criminal case can be impeached with his prior convictions if he
decides to exercise his right to testify at trial.10 That is, the prosecution can argue that
the defendant is untrustworthy because he was previously convicted of an unrelated
crime in prior proceedings. The policy underlying this rule is what Professor H.
Richard Uviller once described as the "ancient assumption" that "[f]elons of all
descriptions are forever afterward less truthful than other folk on any subject.""
Rule 609 is one of the most controversial, if not the most controversial, of all of the
rules of evidence. 12 In fact, the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes has
been the subject of numerous law review articles and other legal commentary, much of
which harshly criticizes the rule and its underlying premise.'1 3 It is widely known and
accepted that a criminal defendant whose prior criminal record is revealed to a jury is
highly likely to be convicted based on that prior record.14 Indeed, a criminal defendant
with a record is much more likely to be convicted than one without a record. 15 Scholars
and judges largely recognize prior convictions to be highly prejudicial to criminal
9. Id.
10. FED. R. EvrD. 609.
11. H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L.J. 776, 803-04 (1993).
12. Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics
of Rule 609, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 2295, 2295 (1994) ("No provision of the Federal Rules of
Evidence has sparked more controversy than Rule 609 .. "); Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock
and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REv.
1, 6 (1997) ("The issue [of impeachment through prior convictions] is perhaps one of the most
controversial in the law of evidence.").
13. See, e.g., Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for
Reform, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1 (1988); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence:
Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1991);
Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b),
608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135 (1989); Uviller, supra note 11.
14. Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at
How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 3 (1999) ("It is
widely accepted that in all likelihood a jury will consider the evidence for improper purposes.").
15. See id. at 38-40, 41 n.421 (noting that prior records "increase the likelihood of
conviction" and that jurors who know about prior convictions are "significantly more likely to
convict" a defendant than jurors without such information").
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defendants. 16 The current scheme under Rule 609 places a criminal defendant in a no-
win situation. The defendant can remain silent and not testify-thus prejudicing him in
the eyes of the jury for failing to tell his side of the story-or he can face certain
prejudice by testifying and being impeached with his convictions. Effectively, then,
Rule 609 impeachment provides prosecutors a route to "efficient" convictions. 17 Given
the degree of criticism of the rule, its failure to ascertain credibility with any measure
of certainty, and the grave potential to cause prejudice to criminal defendants, it is
baffling why it remains a part of evidence law.
This Article fills a gap in the legal scholarship on impeachment with prior
convictions, providing a race critique of the practice and suggesting that race plays a
role in the continued viability of the "ancient assumption" that once someone is
convicted of a crime, he is forever untrustworthy. This Article also contributes to the
legal scholarship on race and the criminal justice system, which has not given enough
attention to the impact of evidentiary rules on the overrepresentation of minorities in
the criminal justice system. Because of the mass incarceration of minority defendants,
particularly Black defendants, race should be of paramount concern to scholars
critiquing the theory and practice of impeachment with prior convictions. It is simply
not enough to critique the rule as if it were race neutral.
Recent statistics reveal that nearly half of all inmates in state or federal prisons and
local jails are non-Hispanic Blacks.18 In terms of raw numbers, there are more than one
million Blacks in prison or jail on any given day.19 These numbers are staggering, and
unfortunately, they seem to be rising. Commentators have offered various compelling
theories explaining the disproportionate number of incarcerated Blacks, including the
following: the "over-policing" of Black communities, 20 the "war on drugs" (which
16. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of
Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 O1HO ST. L.J. 495,498-99 (1995) ("Rule 609 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides one of the most potent, and potentially prejudicial, methods
of impeachment.... In a criminal case, when the defendant is impeached with his prior
convictions, it is widely recognized that the defendant faces a unique, and often devastating,
form of prejudice.").
17. Dodson, supra note 14, at 4 ("Current rules generally allowing prior conviction
evidence place a premium on efficiently convicting people.").
18. See Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2006) (noting that "Blacks, who make up less than
thirteen percent of the U.S. population, now comprise nearly half of all people in prison").
19. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrdus Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 829, 849 n.62 (2000) (asserting that if
Delaware's entire population were Black, it could represent the number of Blacks in prison on
any given day and citing a study finding that half of the 1.5 million incarcerated persons in the
United States are Black); Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 525, 585 (2002) (estimating that in 2000,
"roughly one million [Blacks] were housed in prisons and jails across the country"); Michael
Selmi, Getting Beyond Affirmative Action: ThinkingAbout Racial Inequality in the Twenty-First
Century, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1013, 1039 (2002) (noting that Black men alone make up almost half
of the two million people who are incarcerated in the United States); Monroe Anderson, War on
Drugs Kills Blacks, Op-Ed., Cii. SuN-TIMEs, May 27, 2007, at B7 ("Right now, there are more
than 1 million [Black] men in prison .... ).
20. Imani Perry, Post-Intent Racism: A New Framework for an Old Problem, 19 NAT'L
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unfairly targets minorities), 21 prosecutorial bias,22 and other flaws and biases in the trial
process that result in Blacks receiving harsher treatment than Whites and innocent
minority defendants being convicted. 23 These well-supported theories contradict the
notion that Blacks are simply more prone to committing crimes. To the contrary,
Blacks are more prone to being swept up in a criminal justice system that is, in many
respects, hostile to and biased against them. A rule such as Rule 609, which almost
ensures convictions based simply on a defendant's prior record, is particularly
disturbing when one considers the plight of Blacks in the criminal justice system. Once
a Black person is convicted of a crime (a likely scenario given the current statistics),
that conviction will help to convict him again if he is ever charged with another crime
(another very likely outcome given the "repeat offender" statistics for Blacks).24 Rules
such as Rule 609 keep Blacks ensnared in the criminal system, perpetuating the
criminalization of a staggering percentage of the Black population.
Drawing on the rich scholarship dealing with race and the criminal justice system, I
will offer a critique of the practice of using prior convictions from the minority
perspective, particularly focusing on the Black experience in the criminal justice
system. I argue that given the bias against Blacks and in favor of Whites in the system,
prior convictions lack the type of reliability that the evidentiary rules strive to ensure
and thus raise serious due process concerns.
Part I of this Article considers the general problem of race as predictive character
evidence. I argue that race is evidence inside and outside the courtroom, and most
often race is used to make predictive character judgments. In considering race as
predictive character evidence, I discuss what race scholars and commentators call the
"Black tax," which is the notion that there are extra costs-monetary and non-
monetary-for Blacks in their daily lives because of their race. I focus particularly on
the Black tax in criminal cases and its connection to the idea that blackness equates
BLACKL.J. 113, 133 (2007).
21. Kevin R. Johnson, Taking the "Garbage" Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on Black-
White Romance and Racial Profiling in the "War on Drugs ", 2007 Wis. L. REV. 283, 306
(2007) ("Even though the available statistical data suggests that [W]hites, [B]lacks, Latinos, and
Asian Americans use illicit drugs at roughly comparable rates, the war on drugs has had a
devastating impact on minority communities.").
22. See Note, For the Good of the Child, For the Good of Society: Using Scotland and
Jamaica as Models to Reform U.S. Juvenile Justice Policy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1968
(2002) (discussing prosecutorial bias as a potential source of racial bias in the criminal justice
system).
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. David Cole, What's Criminology Got to Do with It?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1605, 1618
(1996) (citing and discussing a Georgia case study where prosecutors "sought life sentences
over 16 times more often for [B]lack repeat offenders than for [W]hite repeat offenders"); Craig
Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural
Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1575 (2004) (noting that "three
strikes"-type laws contribute to the disproportionate numbers of Blacks incarcerated); Ronald K.
Noble, Between Complicity and Contempt: Racial Presumptions of the American Legal
Process, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 664, 679 n. 106 (1997) (citing findings of disparate punishment for
Black "repeat offenders" in comparison with Whites in the context of drug offenses); Note,
Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2768 (2005) (raising the
possibility that "a three strikes criminal sentencing scheme ... may embody animus toward
minority groups").
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with poor character. I also argue that the Black tax has a corollary, which is the "White
credit." When Blacks are unfairly "taxed" in the criminal system with perceived
criminality, Whites receive an undeserved "credit" with a perceived innocence or
worthiness of redemption. Against this backdrop, I consider the embodiment of race as
predictive character evidence in Rule 609.
Part II looks in depth at Rule 609 in theory and in practice. First, I look at the
historical roots of the prior conviction impeachment practice. The rule came about
after the liberation of the competency rules that did not allow criminal defendants and
felons to testify. After considering its history, I then look at the actual operation of
Rule 609 in depth. I also consider the legislative history of Rule 609, which
demonstrates that for some members of Congress, Rule 609 was more about crime
fighting than truth-seeking. I then reconsider the history of prior conviction
impeachment in the context of the historical treatment of Blacks in the criminal justice
system. Just as criminal defendants and convicted felons were not competent to testify,
historically, Blacks were deemed incompetent witnesses as well. Indeed, there was
substantial overlap in the categories of persons not competent to testify, since Blacks
were disproportionately represented in the criminaljustice system and viewed by many
as criminal by nature. I finally address the issue of whether Rule 609 is actually a real
problem for criminal defendants today. I demonstrate that Rule 609 is indeed
problematic for defendants. I discuss a recent empirical study establishing that a
substantial number of convicted felons, later determined to have been actually
innocent, decided not to testify at their trials for fear that they would be impeached
with their prior convictions. Moreover, I argue that even though the vast majority of
criminal cases do not go to trial and result in plea bargains, defendants often accept
plea deals because they believe that the ability of the prosecutor to impeach them with
their priors substantially weakens their case.
Part III further deconstructs the evidentiary principles underlying Rule 609 and
considers the interplay between those evidentiary principles and the racial bias in the
criminal justice system. I discuss prior convictions as hearsay, admissible only through
Rule 609, which is actually an exception to the rule against hearsay. Commentators
almost always ignore the hearsay nature of prior convictions and simply proceed on the
assumption that the convictions are inherently reliable. But exceptions for hearsay-
such as prior convictions, or judgments from other courts generally-exist because
they are thought to cover evidence that is sufficiently reliable despite being hearsay. I
address modem biases against Blacks in the criminal process, and discuss specific
studies that demonstrate that Blacks are often unfairly and disproportionately targeted
by the criminal justice system. I argue that, from the perspective of Black criminal
defendants and the Black community at large, such hearsay is not reliable.
This lack of reliability, moreover, raises serious due process concerns with respect
to the admissibility of prior convictions against Black defendants. I discuss the due
process issues in Part IV, where I also offer solutions for reform. I propose that
Congress amend Rule 609 by eliminating the practice of impeaching criminal
defendants altogether. I argue that Congress is the more appropriate branch to consider
the arguments that I have outlined regarding the unreliability of prior convictions from
a race perspective, and address the serious due process concerns that they raise. I
alternatively argue that courts should fully analyze the reliability of prior convictions
before admitting them, giving full consideration to biases in the criminal process and
how they shape the perception, or misperception, of Black defendants. Courts will
likely be apprehensive about declaring ajurisdiction's criminal convictions unreliable,
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because such a declaration is more of a political determination. Until Congress acts,
however, courts should require prosecutors to establish the reliability of the
convictions that they offer for impeachment. Courts should also allow criminal
defendants to put on evidence to "impeach" the credibility of the criminal justice
system as a hearsay declarant. If prior convictions are admitted, juries should hear
about potential or probable sources of bias in the system that could have led to the
defendant's criminal conviction.
I. How THE COLOR OF SKIN DEFINES THE CONTENT OF CHARACTER: RECOGNIZING
RACE AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM
Race is evidence. Rule 609 permits juries to infer that witnesses with prior
convictions, including criminal defendants, have poor character for truthfulness. And
studies show that jurors often go even further and misuse the prior conviction as
evidence of bad character generally. As I establish later in this Article, Rule 609
embodies the concept of race as character evidence and, more specifically, it
perpetuates the use of race as evidence of bad character.
In this Part, I discuss race more generally as predictive character evidence. In doing
so, I am not limiting the discussion to race as predictive character evidence in the
courtroom. While it is important to think of the evidentiary value of race in the
courtroom, it is just as important, if not more so, to think of the evidentiary value of
race outside the courtroom. After all, evidence-like that which leads to convictions
that can be used for impeachment under Rule 609-is gathered and processed outside
the courtroom; and it is outside the courtroom that ideas about race are largely shaped.
This Part begins by briefly considering the broad conceptualization of evidence as
traces of past events. We use evidence to connect us to the past. We in turn use past
events, based on our understanding of evidence, to make predictive judgments (as with
character evidence). This Part considers race as "predictive character evidence."
Historically, Blacks were "mischaracterized" using negative stereotypes as a means
to control them socially. Today, the formal barriers of discrimination have been
removed, but the mischaracterization of Blacks remains and manifests itself in what
many race scholars and other commentators have called the "Black tax." The Black tax
refers to the extra penalty that Blacks must pay in their daily lives for being Black. The
Black tax is said to pervade every aspect of the lives of Blacks and is particularly
costly to criminal defendants. This Part discusses the Black tax generally and then
connects its existence to the perceived bad character of Blacks that existed historically
and remains today.
This Part also discusses the corollary of the Black tax, which I call the "White
credit." If Blacks are assessed with the Black tax, then it must follow that someone is
enjoying a benefit-either from the extra penalty that Blacks pay, from the freedom of
not being taxed, or both. The existence of the White credit is consistent with notions
that whiteness is a property right.
A. Learning from the Past: The Predictive Nature of Character Evidence
The evidence rules reflect the legal system's beliefs about the best means by which
to ascertain "truth." As Professor Uviller eloquently put it, "The means by which our
legal facsimile of truth is recreated is the production of 'evidence.' . . . [E]vidence
remains alive in American legal parlance and thought because the rules express some
[Vol. 84:521
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usable ideas about one of the main concerns of the lawyer: the establishment of a fact
as true. 25 The idea of evidence in the general sense is not limited to use by lawyers.
"We all are in the proof business, one way or another."
26
Evidence, in the broad sense, is "the means from which an inference may logically
be drawn as to the existence of a fact.... Evidence is the demonstration of a fact."27 In
constructing our evidence, we are all guided by the footprint theory, according to
which "the past is preserved in the present by altered surfaces of matter and mind."28
The theory is sound because events leave "durable marks in the physical world and
imprints on the minds of witnesses. Detect, inspect, collect, and resurrect these little
clues, then, and the truth is proved. 29 In other words, nothing happens without leaving
some sort of trace.
In addition to considering traces to construct the truth based on past events, we can
also look to predictive evidence. That is, we can take into account certain details as
predictors of actions and occurrences. 30 Predictive evidence is the "primal ancestor" of
trace evidence. 31 The two are logically related because our predictions are based on our
experiences with trace evidence. 32 Professor Uviller illustrated this point in the
following passage:
Consider: why is the footprint relevant to the foot's passage? Having observed feet
pressed into smooth wet sand, having observed muddy shoes walking on clean
floors, having had a variety of experience with similar events involving the track
of feet, we are prepared to say that, because a foot pressed to a surface will leave a
characteristic imprint, therefore such a print was in all likelihood made by a foot.
Thus, while we appear to be reasoning backward from the trace, we are actually
applying experience with many half-forgotten similar events that have taught us to
expect co-existing or sequential phenomena. It is, in short, the predictive lesson of
experience that accords validity to judicial retrospective reasoning.3 3
We use character as a form of predictive evidence. Character evidence is one of the
most powerful and frequently used types of evidence, both inside and outside the
courtroom. We assess character on a daily basis, making predictive determinations
based on past experiences. 34 Generally, however, the rules of evidence prohibit the use
of character evidence to show that a person acted in conformity with her character on a
particular occasion.3 5 In other words, the character-propensity ban prohibits
retrospective reasoning based on a person's character. The problem with character
25. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 845-46 (1982).
26. Id. at 846.
27. James B. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARv. L. REv. 141, 142
(1889).
28. Uviller, supra note 25, at 846.
29. Id. at 847.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 848.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 850.
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evidence is not that it is thought to be irrelevant.36 To the contrary, the general ban
against character is based on the concern that jurors might give too much weight to
character evidence and will decide the case based largely or solely on a person's
character.37 As I will discuss in Part II, Rule 609 is a specific exception to the
character-propensity ban that permits a jury to consider a prior conviction as evidence
of untruthfulness, though not as evidence of general bad character.
Though the rules of evidence have adopted a general policy against the use of
character evidence, they do not really account for or address the more subtle ways that
character evidence is introduced to the jury. A juror could form a positive or negative
opinion regarding a person's character simply based on the way that person looks.
Attorneys are well aware of this fact and will often advise their clients on how to dress,
how to sit, and how to look at the jury, the judge, and other participants in the trial. A
particularly difficult and troubling subset of this issue of informal character assessment
by the jury is how jurors perceive the race of parties and other participants in the trial.
Jurors, of course, come from the real world where race does matter.
B. Viewing Character Through a Racially Biased Lens: Assessing the "Black Tax"
and Granting the "White Credit"
If the footprint theory of evidence is indeed sound, then the fact of a person's race is
predictive evidence of something and will factor into retrospective reasoning. That
predictive evidence is shaped by trace evidence-some type of experience, be it the
learning of stereotypes, some first-hand experience, or maybe both-that left an
impression or imprint in our minds. The following questions then arise: What type of
footprint does race leave today? How is this footprint used to predict behavior?
1. Race as Predictive Character Evidence
In our society, blackness often connotes bad character. Race generally-as used in
American society-has relevance in day-to-day assessments of character. When Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. famously told America of his dream for its future-his dream
that his "four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged
by the color of their skin but by the content of their character ' 3 -he identified just
why racism is fundamentally unfair. It is unfair because it is a means of circumventing
an accurate assessment of character. His use of the word "judged" is significant
because often the idea ofjudging connotes the forming of an opinion "through careful
weighing of evidence and testing of premises" or the drawing of conclusions "after
inquiry and deliberation." 39 The word "judge" can also have a more negative
connotation, meaning "to criticize or condemn somebody on moral grounds' 40 without
an adequate basis.
36. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
37. Id. at 476.
38. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream 3 (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speeches/address-at-march-on-washington.p
df.
39. Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/judge.
40. MSN ENCARTA DICTiONARY (2007), http://encarta.msn/dictionary_/judge.html.
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When a Black person is judged by the color of her skin, it is often a condemnation
that is not the result of either careful weighing of evidence and testing of premises or
inquiry and deliberation. The efficient but invidious judgment based on race is often
the result of previous consideration of stereotypes regarding Blacks from the media or
other sources-or maybe even prior experiences. But to use such information and
judge an individual nevertheless leads to the type ofjudgment that Dr. King dreamed
of which Blacks could be free. That famous phrase from Dr. King's speech, which
noted two possible ways that a Black person would be judged-one the foundation of
his dream and the other the foundation of Black oppression-implies that race has
evidentiary value. If one can be judged by the color of his skin, then in the evidentiary
sense, skin color has probative value.
Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."4 1 Applying this definition, race in America historically had, and currently
has, evidentiary relevance.
2. The Historical Use of Race as Predictive Character Evidence
During the slavery era, race was of consequence to the determination of a person's
status as a slave or a free person. In nearly every jurisdiction, one could legally
presume upon encountering a person who was "evidently" Black that he or she was a
slave (though this presumption could be proven wrong).42 For example, in Gentry v.
McMinnis, a Kentucky court discussed the evidentiary value of a person's race: "[A]
[B]lack or mulatto complexion isprimafacie evidence that the person of such color is
a slave .... [B]eing a [W]hite person, or having less than a fourth of African blood, is
primafacie evidence of freedom. '43
In terms of relevance, the person's race had a tendency to make it more probable
that he was a slave. Beyond the issue of slave status, race was widely used in the
criminal justice system to determine severity of penalties. Blacks were subject to
41. FED.R.EviD.401.
42. See Jason A. Gillmer, Suing for Freedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial
Identity in the Post-Revolutionary andAntebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REv. 535, 602,604 n.465
(2004) (observing that "[tlhe presumption of slavery from blackness and freedom from
whiteness was adopted in virtually every jurisdiction," with Delaware being "[o]ne notable
exception").
43. 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 382, 385 (1835); see also Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.)
134 (1806). In Hudgins, Judge Tucker stated that "[a]ll [W]hite persons are and ever have been
free in this country. If one evidently [W]hite, be notwithstanding claimed as a slave, the proof
lies on the party claiming to make the other his slave." Id. at 139. Judge Roane elaborated on
this proposition as follows:
In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the presumption is, in this
country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent on him to make out his right to
freedom: but in the case of a person visibly appearing to be a [W]hite man, or an
Indian, the presumption is that he is free, and it is necessary for his adversary to
shew [sic] that he is a slave.
Id. at 141. See also Gillmer, supra note 42, at 601 (noting that there was "a legal presumption
that [B]lack people were slaves and [W]hite people and Native Americans were free").
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harsher penalties than Whites for various crimes.44 For example, many offenses were
designated capital offenses if the accused was Black.45 In the context of rape
prosecutions after the Civil War, where the accused was Black and the alleged victim
was White, evidence that the accused was Black could be evidence of his intent.
46
In these examples, the bridge that connects race to the evidentiary concept of
relevance is that race was thought to predict character. And it is in that sense that the
law used race as character evidence. Race had a tendency to make it much more
probable that persons who happened to be Black would be characterized as bad actors
for whom slavery and tougher penalties for crimes were necessary. Indeed, to justify
their enslavement of Blacks and the harsher treatment of Blacks in the criminal justice
system, White slave owners and legislators constructed a mischaracterization of Blacks
using multiple negative stereotypes. Among other things, Blacks were characterized as
being lazy, unclean, dishonest, ignorant, and violent. The common denominator with
all of the stereotypes was that they reinforced the idea of the Black person as inferior to
the White person. To maintain social control over Blacks, Whites again used their
mischaracterization of Blacks to justify harsher punishments for slaves and free Blacks
in the criminal justice system.
Of course, the law no longer tolerates formal racism and its mischaracterization of
Blacks. Overt racism is not fashionable or politically correct. A person who openly
holds negative views about a person on the basis of race will most likely be ostracized.
Race, nevertheless, still plays a significant-though more subtle-evidentiary role in
American society today.
3. The "Black Tax"
Blacks and other minority community members, as well as civil rights activists,
scholars, commentators, and other observers, have long noted the problem of the
"Black tax. 'A7 Professor Jody Armour, in particular, wrote extensively about the Black
tax in his seminal work Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The Hidden Costs of
Being Black in America.48 As Professor Armour defines it, "[t]he Black tax is the price
44. See Robert J. Cottrol, Finality with Ambivalence: The American Death Penalty's
Uneasy History, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1641, 1653 (2004) (book review).
45. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and Reproduction, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1945, 1955
(1993).
46. See Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting
Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 COLuM. L. REv. 1404, 1413
(2007).
47. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REv. 571, 591 (2003); Carolyn C. Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TuL. L. REv. 653,658-
59 (1998); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1143-44 (2000); Cheryl L. Wade,
Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care and
Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 389, 430 (2002).
48. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13 (1997). Numerous commentators discuss Armour's
important text. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 17,60 n.230 (2004); Jones, supra note
47, at 680 n. 186; Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, ByAny Other Name?: On Being
"Regarded as " Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even ifLakisha and Jamal Are White,
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Black people pay in their encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black
stereotypes. ' 49 Blacks are forced to accept and literally pay the Black tax on a daily
basis. The "payment" can be in actual dollars or in less tangible, but nevertheless very
real, social disadvantages. 50
The term "Black tax" was used as early as the 1950s to describe the higher housing
prices that West Indians had to pay to get housing in Britain.5' More recently, the New
York Times published an article on the "Ghetto Tax," a variation of the Black tax.52 In
that article, the Times discussed a study demonstrating that "poor urban residents
frequently pay hundreds if not thousands of dollars a year in extra costs for everyday
necessities., 53 For example, the article noted that "[dirivers from low-income
neighborhoods ofNew York, Hartford and Baltimore, insuring identical cars and with
the same driving records as those from middle-class neighborhoods, paid $400 more on
average for a year's insurance., 54 The article also noted that "rent to own" stores,
notorious for inflating prices on appliances and furniture, primarily prey upon poor
people, their "main customers., 55 The poor pay more for car loans and to cash
checks. 56 And of course, Blacks make up a large proportion of "the poor" in this
country. So the ghetto tax is in many ways simply a sub-category of the Black tax.
57
In his book, Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism, Professor Armour discusses the
Black tax with respect to the criminal justice system. "Like a tax, racial discrimination
is persistent [and] pervasive .... And just as the state stands behind the collection of
2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283, 1337 n.231.
49. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 13.
50. In the employment setting, Blacks often observe that they must work "twice as hard" to
earn same respect and employment benefits that their White counterparts more easily achieve.
See Amani Roberts, Something New: An Interview with Director Sanaa Hamri and Actress
Sanaa Lathan, STORYBOARD (Wash., D.C. Film Society, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2006,
http://www.dcfilmsociety.org/storyboard0602.htm (noting that the use of the phrase "Black tax"
"refers to being [Black] and having to work twice as hard to keep pace with White counterparts
... especially in corporate America"); Urban Dictionary: Black Tax, http://www.
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=black+tax (defining Black Tax as "[t]he notion that Black
people have to work and perform regular task [sic] twice as well as White people"). Some have
even observed that Black politicians pay a Black tax in elections. They usually post poll
numbers that are between five and ten points higher than their actual elections results because
some "White people are ashamed of saying I won't vote for that guy because he's Black." Chris
Matthews Show (MSNBC television broadcast Oct. 22, 2006). The election of Barack Obama
may suggest that the Black tax no longer exists with respect to elections, or at least that it can be
overcome by issues that voters consider much more important, such as the economy. I would
suggest that only time will tell, particularly with respect to local elections, whether the Black tax
has really been repealed for elections.
51. Jones, supra note 47, at 681.
52. Erik Eckholm, Study Documents 'Ghetto Tax' Being Paid by the Urban Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2006, at A14.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Black tax does not just describe the penalties imposed by Whites. For example,
some accomplished Blacks note that they have an "obligation" to return and give back to their
communities in a way that Whites simply do not. See Jones, supra note 47, at 680.
57. See Eckholm, supra note 52 (noting that the "ghetto tax" is likely to increase prices for
poor people and minorities).
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the general taxes, Blacks often have good cause to view state representatives such as
police andjudicial officers as IRS agents for the Black tax."58 Examples of the Black
tax, according to Professor Armour, include "profile stops of Blacks by drug
enforcement officers," and "Blacks being stopped and interrogated by police for
walking or jogging through 'White' neighborhoods." 59 The tax metaphor is an apt one,
as "[t]axation [is often viewed] as a regular and unpleasant interaction between state
and citizen ... ,60
In dealing with police, Blacks-regardless of socioeconomic status-are often
subjected to racial profiling, unwarranted suspicions, and other indignities. 61 In
discussing "Negrophobia," Professor Armour noted that the fear ofBlack violence was
"the most disturbing source of dread in modem America." 62 He pointed to "[p]olls and
studies [that] repeatedly show[ed] that most Americans believe that Blacks are 'prone
to violence. " 63 In describing blackness as a proxy for character, one scholar stated:
When the public thinks about criminals they see a dark face. Consider the way
doorbells are used in some city stores to keep criminals out. Race is often used as a
predictor of bad character. The buzzers are meant to keep the criminals out. Race
is used as a predictor of criminality. Consider "driving while Black" cases; stops
and searches where police use race as a predictor of criminality.64
Professor Adeno Addis has observed that the media puts out a "daily narrative about
crime" that "paints a picture of the [B]lack criminal threatening the innocence of
[W]hite America., 65 Professor Addis continues, concluding "'[C]rime' has virtually
become a metaphor to describe young [B]lack men.",66
In Obama's speech on race, he candidly noted that his own White grandmother, who
helped to rear and care for him, "confessed her fear of [B]lack men who passed by her
on the street," and "on more than one occasion has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes
that made [Obama] cringe., 67 Among other Blacks, there is ample anecdotal evidence
that supports the notion that there is a pervasive perception of Black criminality in this
68country. Indeed, even as some other negative stereotypes about Blacks have
decreased, the idea that Blacks are more "criminally inclined" remains "one of the
most pervasive, well-known, and persistent stereotypes in American culture." 69
58. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 14.
60. Jones supra note 47, at 658.
61. See infra Part III.C.
62. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 2.
63. Id.
64. Josephine Ross, "He Looks Guilty": Reforming Good Character Evidence to Undercut
the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 227, 262-63 (2004); see also Roberts, supra note
45, at 1946-61 (arguing that the criminal justice system has constructed blackness as criminality
as a means of social subordination).
65. Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2253, 2263 (1993).
66. Id.
67. Obama speech, supra note 3.
68. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 2-4.
69. Mona Lynch, Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Life-and-Death Decision Making, in FROM
LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STONE 182, 188 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
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Professor Armour notes that the criminal penalties that Blacks pay as a result of the
Black tax are not so much due to the "Mark Furhman" or "Ku Klux Klan"-type of
racism. 70 He posits that the Black tax in the criminal context results from either
"unconscious mental reflexes" or the perception that Blacks commit more crimes and
are more dangerous than persons who are not Black.71 Noting that conscious racism
may prompt police to engage in racial profiling-as when police stop Blacks simply
because they are walking in a "White" neighborhood-he also reasons that the police
may view their actions as "responding reasonably" and rightly being suspicious of
persons who seem "out of place. 72 Hence, Professor Armour uses the term
"reasonable racism." Reasonable racism leads a White person to perpetuate the
construction of Black criminality based on stereotypes or crime statistics, 73 as well as
perceptions about the way others view Blacks or even an isolated personal experience
with a particular Black person. While I have no doubt that there are still some "Mark-
Furhman-type" racists who are decision makers in the criminal justice system,
Professor Armour's observations regarding misperceptions about Black criminality are
consistent with studies, like those that I discuss in Part III, exposing racial bias in the
criminal process.
The Black tax reflects the use of race as predictive character evidence. It stems from
the notion that somehow Blacks have a fundamentally "bad" character and are less
deserving than Whites. Thus, with respect to housing or other purchases, Blacks must
compensate for their perceived unworthiness through higher interest rates. In the
employment setting, they must compensate for their perceived unworthiness by
working harder than their White counterparts for the same benefits. And in the criminal
context, they must pay for their perceived unworthiness by dealing with a hostile
system that has made them the very face of criminality.
4. The "White Credit"
A part of the Black tax that is often overlooked is its corollary, which I will refer to
as the "White credit." The assessment of the Black tax, be it through Blacks being
charged higher interest rates or having to work "twice as hard," provides Whites with
undeserved benefits. When Blacks pay higher interest rates than Whites do, not only do
the people, usually White, receiving the payments enjoy an undeserved benefit, but
those White consumers who enjoy the best rates also enjoy a benefit because of their
skin color.
In the context of the criminal justice system, the White credit is particularly
beneficial. White drivers, who do not have to concern themselves with the burdens of
racial profiling and baseless traffic stops, enjoy an undeserved benefit. White criminal
defendants enjoy an undeserved benefit from being White because the face of crime in
America is decidedly Black. As I demonstrate in Part III, the system often punishes
Blacks more harshly than Whites who have committed the same acts.
The White credit is consistent with the theory of whiteness as property. Professor
Cheryl Harris has written extensively about whiteness as property, noting in particular
2006).
70. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 13-14.
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id.
73. Cf id.
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that historically, "White identity conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits
and was jealously guarded as a valued possession." 74 Moreover, she noted that in
modem society, "[w]hen the law recognizes, either implicitly or explicitly, the settled
expectations of [W]hites built on the privileges and benefits produced by [W]hite
supremacy, it acknowledges and reinforces a property interest in whiteness that
reproduces Black subordination., 75 The privileged treatment that Whites receive in the
criminal justice system is an example of the law's reinforcement of whiteness as
property.
C. The Racially Biased Operation of Apparently Race Neutral Rules of Evidence
It is my position that, as a general matter, the rules of evidence should be structured
in a way that openly acknowledges the evidentiary value of race while simultaneously
working to diminish that value to the extent that it is unfairly prejudicial. The rules
currently operate in the opposite manner. They do not acknowledge the evidentiary
value of race but at the same time often operate in a manner that perpetuates and
increases the probative value and prejudicial effect of race. Not only does the Black tax
manifest itself in the way that jurors and prosecutors independently view Black
defendants, but the Black tax is camouflaged in the rules of evidence that filter what
the jury hears about the case. This is true particularly in criminal cases.
The evidence rules, which appear to be race neutral, can instead operate in a racially
biased manner, giving race evidentiary value. In many ways, the racially biased
operation of the rules of evidence is more troubling than prosecutors', jurors', and
judges' misuse of race as evidence. The rules are an official statement about what
constitutes reliable evidence in a courtroom. When the rules of evidence give unfair
prejudicial evidentiary value to race, they sanction the practice in a very official
manner and empower prosecutors to appeal to racial bias and jurors and even judges to
make decisions based on racial bias.
The remainder of this Article deals in particular with the use of race as evidence in
the operation of Rule 609. Rule 609, which characterizes persons with prior
convictions as untrustworthy, relies solely on the criminal justice system in identifying
those witnesses who are not credible. The rule, however, does not account for the
treatment of Blacks in the criminal justice system though numerous studies have
demonstrated that racial bias exists at every stage in the criminal justice process.
Moreover, as most Americans associate Blacks with crime, revealing a Black
defendant's prior convictions under Rule 609 reinforces widely held stereotypes about
Blacks and encourages jurors to engage in reasonable racism. Throughout the criminal
process, police, prosecutors, witnesses, judges, and jurors have been shown to engage
in reasonable racism in one form or another. The current practice of prior conviction
impeachment then makes use of prior convictions rooted in reasonable racism as
evidence to obtain more convictions, resulting in the creation of Black recidivism.
In the next Part, I will discuss Rule 609 generally, in theory and in practice. The
Rule, which in theory uses prior convictions as evidence of untruthful character, in
practice is the product of legislative compromises made as lawmakers grappled with
74. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1726 (1993).
75. Id. at 1731.
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related evidentiary issues that have existed for hundreds of years. Those issues include
how to deal with testimony of persons with a criminal record, persons considered to be
likely liars, and how to deal with testimony of criminal defendants, who were
historically considered "the most likely liars of all."76
II. RuLE 609 IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
This part considers the operation of Rule 609 in theory and in practice. I first
discuss the historical roots of Rule 609, which developed after the demise of
competency rules that kept several classes of witnesses off the stand, including
convicted felons. Next, I look at the operation of Rule 609 today, as an exception to the
general ban against character evidence. I then look at the controversial legislative
history behind Rule 609, which was adopted in the 1970s and strongly supported by
those who saw it as a crime fighting tool more so than just a rule about witness
credibility. Against that backdrop, I reconsider the history of Rule 609 in its social and
racial context. Finally, I demonstrate that as a practical matter Rule 609 is quite
problematic for criminal defendants, especially Black criminal defendants.
A. Historical Roots of Prior Conviction Impeachment
Professor George Fisher provides a fascinating account of the historical evolution of
juries to their current and relatively new "formal and complete role as the [judicial]
system's lie detector." 77 Professor Fisher recounts the demise of the old competency
rules, which effectively kept juries from having to determine the credibility of
witnesses.78 Under the old rules, if a person took the oath, it was conclusive evidence
that he was telling the truth. 79 Because of the strength of the oath, the competency rules
kept certain individuals whom the system considered"likely liars" from taking the oath
and testifying.80 Those individuals included persons who had an interest in the outcome
of the trial, such as parties' spouses, "irreligious persons," civil parties, and persons
having "financial interests" in the outcome of the case.8' The underlying purpose for
these competency rules was to exclude as witnesses "anyone whose temptation or
inclination to lie was greater than average."
8 2
The judicial system considered criminal defendants in particular to be the "most
likely liars of all."8 3 The system also considered persons previously convicted of
crimes to be likely liars and hence prohibited them from testifying.84 As with convicted
felons and criminal defendants, the competency rules in the United States prohibited
76. George Fisher, The Rise of the Jury as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 624-25, 661-
62 (1997).
77. Id. at 581.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 580.
80. Id. at 624-25.
81. Id. at 624.
82. Id. at 625.
83, Id. at 662.
84, Id. at 624-25.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Blacks from testifying as well, at least in certain circumstances. 85 Eventually, common
law jurisdictions abandoned the old competency rules, even the rules excluding
testimony from convicted felons, criminal defendants, and from Blacks. 86 There was a
catch, however, in the abandonment of the competency rules. Anyone who testified,
even criminal defendants, would be subject to impeachment with his or her prior
convictions.87 Rule 609 codified the practice of impeaching witnesses, including
criminal defendants, with their prior convictions.
B. Rule 609: An Exception to the General Ban on Character-Propensity Evidence
Generally, the Rules of Evidence forbid the use of character evidence to show that a
person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.88 This general ban on
character-propensity evidence is embodied in Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.89 The underlying rationale for the ban is not that such evidence is irrelevant.
Instead, the concern is that the jury will give the evidence too much weight, and in the
case of a criminal defendant, convict the defendant on the basis of prior bad conduct
instead of focusing on his guilt or innocence with respect to the current charges. Rule
609, among others, is an express exception to this general ban on character-propensity
evidence. 90 The rule permits the use of certain prior convictions to show that a witness
has a propensity to lie. Juries are not, however, supposed to use the prior convictions as
evidence of the defendant's bad character generally.
Under the federal version of the prior conviction impeachment rule, the prosecution
or defense can impeach any witness, including a defendant who chooses to testify, with
evidence of her prior convictions.9 Congress passed Rule 609 in 1975, and most states
have adopted Rule 609 or some version of it.
In fact, only one state, Montana, prohibits completely the use ofprior convictions
of any type to impeach. 92 Twenty-five states have adopted Rule 609, almost to the
85. See id. at 671-97 (discussing the rules excluding testimony from all Black witnesses
and the ultimate abandonment of those rules); see also Katherine Hunt Federle, Children,
Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1315, 1341-42 (1995) (noting that under the
slave codes, Blacks could not testify against Whites); James Forman, Jr., Juries andRace in the
Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 911 (2004) (discussing the congressional debate after
the Civil War over whether Blacks should be permitted to testify); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. &
Anne F. Jacobs, The Law Only as an Enemy, The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness
Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REv. 969, 993
(1992) ("[P]erhaps one of the most basic procedural deprivations that [B]lacks, enslaved and
free, suffered was their preclusion from testifying against [W]hites and, during certain periods,
from testifying against other [B]lacks, mulattoes, and Indians.").
86. See Fisher, supra note 76, at 659-71.
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587, 589 (1867) (finding that criminal
defendants were not "exempt" from "impeachment as a witness" and that there was "no reason
why [they] should be").
88. FED. R. EviD. 404.
89. Id.
90. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(3) (recognizing Rule 609 as an exception to the general ban on
character-propensity evidence).
91. FED. R. Evw. 609.
92. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-609 (2008). Montana's Rule 609 states simply: "For the
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letter, 93 while twelve states have adopted a less restrictive version of Rule 609.94 Four
states only allow impeachment with convictions involving dishonesty or false
statements. 95 Five other states permit impeachment with felonies only.96 This Article
will refer mainly to the federal rule, as it represents the "model rule" for dealing with
prior conviction impeachment.
The theory underlying Rule 609 is that a person who has in the past committed a
crime is less credible than a person with a "spotless record., 97 The evidence is
necessary, the theory goes, because without it jurors would likely presume that the
witness is an upstanding citizen who has led a life beyond reproach and is, therefore,
worthy of being believed.98
Under the federal scheme, generally, only convictions punishable by death or
imprisonment for more than a year can be used for impeachment. 99 But the length of
punishment is irrelevant if the prior conviction was for a crime that required an act of
dishonesty or a false statement to satisfy the crime's elements.100 For convictions other
than those involving dishonesty or false statement, there are distinctions in Rule 609 in
the standards for impeaching ordinary witnesses and defendants who testify. The prior
convictions of ordinary witnesses are subject to the ordinary Rule 403 catchall
balancing test. 10' Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. 102 This rule applies to nearly all otherwise admissible evidence.103
The prior convictions of criminal defendants, however, are subject to a different
standard, which is found in the text of Rule 609(a)(1): the probative value of the
conviction has to outweigh the prejudicial effect to the accused.' °4 In theory, the
standard for admitting the prior conviction of a defendant is higher than the standard
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of
a crime is not admissible." Id.
93. See ALA. R. EviD. 609; ARIz. R. EviD. 609; ARK. R. EvID. 609; DEL. R. EviD. 609; FLA.
R. EVlD. 609; IND. R. EviD. 609; IOWA R. EviD. 609; ME. R. EvlD. 609; MINN. R. EVID. 609;
Miss. R. EviD. 609; NEB. R. EvID. 609; N.H. R. EVID. 609; N.M. R. EvID. 609; N.D. R. EVID.
609; OHIO R. EviD. 609; 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2609 (1992); S.C. R. EVID. 609; S.D. R. EVD.
609; TENN. R. EviD. 609; TEx. R. EvlD. 609; UTAH R. EvtD. 609; VT. R. EvlD. 609; WASH. R.
EVID. 609; W. VA. R. EvlD. 609; Wyo. R. EviD. 609.
94. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-101 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20(b)
(2002); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-16 (LexisNexis 2002); LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 609-1
(2006); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (1996);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4513 (McKinney 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-269 (2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
906.09 (West 2000); N.C.R. EVID. 609; N.J. R. EvID. 609; R.I. R. EVID. 609; TEx. R. EviD. 609;.
95. See ALASKA R. EviD. 609; HAW. R. Evm. 609; KAN. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-
421(West 2005); PA. R. EvID. 609.
96. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 2008); CONN. R. EviD. § 6-7; IDAHO R. EVID. 609;
Ky. R. EvID. 609; NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 50.095 (LexisNexis 2006).
97. Gold, supra note 12, at 2298.
98. Id.
99. FED. R. EvID. 609.
100. Id.
101. FED. R. EvlD. 403, 609.
102. FED. R. EviD. 403.
103. See id.
104. FED. R. EvlD. 609.
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for admitting the prior conviction of an ordinary witness.105 With respect to criminal
defendants, the prosecutor carries the burden of showing that the probative value of the
conviction outweighs the prejudicial effect to the accused.' °6 With respect to other
witnesses, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to exclude the conviction to show
that, under Rule 403, the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. 0 7 The rule, therefore, on its face recognizes the inherent prejudice to
a criminal defendant when the jury is informed of his or her prior convictions. In
practice, however, judges routinely admit evidence of testifying defendants' prior
convictions for impeachment purposes,108 and appellate courts routinely affirm trial
judges' admission of such evidence. 0 9
Rule 609 also distinguishes between the types of crimes with which a witness or
defendant who chooses to testify may be impeached. Unlike general felonies, crimes
requiring in the establishment of their elements dishonesty or false statement are per se
admissible." 10 In other words, there is no applicable balancing test, and there is no
discretion for the trial judge to exclude them. Convictions older than ten years are
presumptively inadmissible, and the inherent prejudice with respect to such convictions
can be overcome only upon finding that "the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect.""' The rule is most protective of juvenile adjudications, which are simply
inadmissible against criminal defendants.1 2 And for ordinary witnesses, juvenile
adjudications are only admissible if the court finds that they are "necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."
'
"
13
As applied to the criminal defendant, the obvious problem with Rule 609 is the
grave likelihood, indeed the near guarantee, of prejudice to the accused."14 As
105. Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1113, 1119
(2003) ("In effect, [Rule 609] tells judges to give more protection to criminal defendants than to
other witnesses in balancing prejudice against probative value."); Chris William Sanchirico,
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 CoLuM. L. REV. 1227, 1282-83 n. 134 (2001)
("At least as written, this test [under Rule 609] leans more toward inadmissibility when the
current action is a criminal prosecution and the witness is the accused."); Donald H. Zeigler,
The Confusing Relationship Between Rules 608(b) and Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 46 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 527, 530 (2003) ("Rule 609... makes it more difficult to
impeach an accused than to impeach other witnesses with a conviction.").
106. Zeigler, supra note 105, at 531.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 15, 45 (198 1) (noting that there are various aspects of our criminal justice system
that "threaten convictions of the innocent," including the "routine introduction of prior
convictions to impeach defendants").
109. Uviller, supra note 11, at 807 n.69.
110. FED. R. EvID. 609; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 63 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999) (noting that "[c]rimes involving 'dishonesty or false statement,' regardless of the
punishment or against whom used, do not require balancing of probative value against
prejudice; under 609(a)(2), they are automatically admissible").
111. FED. R. EviD. 609(b).
112. FED. R. EvID. 609(d).
113. Id.
114. Gold, supra note 12, at 2325.
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recognized by the Luck/Gordon doctrine, which supplied the test for the admission of
prior convictions before the enactment of Rule 609, this potential for prejudice is
certainly not a new concern."l 5 To the contrary, it has always been largely known and
expected that juries will misuse this evidence despite courts' limiting instructions
informing them of the purpose of the evidence. 16 And a recent empirical study has
confirmed what courts, commentators, and lawmakers have suspected for years,
revealing fmdings that "uniformly suggest that knowledge of a defendant's prior record
promotes conviction in close cases, those where one should be most concerned about
erroneous conviction" and noting that "[t]he criminal record effect could be even
stronger than [the researchers] have found in these analyses."' 17 In some ways the law
actually recognizes the potential prejudice inherent in revealing prior convictions of
criminal defendants. In fact, the erroneous admission of prior conviction evidence
"even in the face of other evidence amply supporting the verdict, constitutes plain error
impinging upon the fundamental fairness of the trial itself."'" As the Tenth Circuit has
put it:
[A]n obvious truth is that once prior convictions are introduced the trial is, for all
practical purposes, completed and the guilty outcome follows as a mere formality.
This is true regardless of the care and caution employed by the court in instructing
the jury. Thus, it is clear that the problem is not a simple evidentiary one, but
rather goes to the fundamental fairness and justice of the trial itself." 9
Ifjurors hear that the accused was previously convicted of a crime, even if the crime
was completely unrelated to the current charges against the defendant, there is a
substantial likelihood, indeed a substantial probability, that the jury will convict the
115. See Dodson, supra note 14, at 4-5.
116. Id. at3.
117. Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect
of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes 94 CORNELL L.
REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2009) (manuscript at 32), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid--998529. For commentary discussing the
widespread suspicion regarding juror misuse of prior convictions admitted for impeachment, see
Cordray, supra note 16, at 506-07, which states:
The danger, and therefore the risk of prejudice, lies in the difficulty of making
th[e] distinction [between using evidence of prior convictions for assessing the
credibility of the criminal defendant and using this evidence to prove act
propensity]. It is widely agreed that a jury is unlikely to maintain the distinction,
even with the help of a limiting instruction .... [D]espite any limiting instruction
the judge might give, there is a significant risk that the jury will use the evidence
of prior crimes in its determination of guilt.
Id.
118. United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations
omitted).
119. United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384, 1389-90 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204-05 (10th Cir. 1972)); see also McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 110, § 42, at 65 (noting the "obvious danger" that a jury will misuse a prior conviction as
evidence of the defendant's guilt).
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defendant for being a "bad" person generally. 120 Moreover, in determining whether the
accused is guilty, the jury is likely to give excessive or improper weight to the prior
conviction.
The typical charge instructing the jury on prior convictions used for impeachment
purposes instructs them to not consider the convictions as evidence of guilt but to help
"judge the credibility and weight of the testimony given by the defendant as a witness
in this trial."12' Even though trial courts routinely render such instructions that are
nearly intellectually impossible to follow, appellate courts refuse to find error, resting
upon the settled fiction that presumes juries understand and follow trial judges'
instructions. 122 But there is ample research showing that the many jurors simply do not
understand jury instructions.123 Moreover, studies show that it is almost impossible for
jurors to put aside forceful and prejudicial evidence even when the court specifically
instructs them to do so.' 24 And there is no doubt that evidence of a defendant's prior
conviction is both powerful and prejudicial.125
The other problem with Rule 609 is that it provides for the admissibility of evidence
with relatively low probative value. Professor Uviller specifically criticized Rule 609
on this point, stating that "[t]he theoretical discontinuity perpetuated by Rule 609 is a
major wrench to reason.", 126 He questioned the probative value of prior conviction
impeachment, calling it an "ancient precept" that "is the reverse of common
experience."' 127 Prior convictions are simply not predictive of who will likely lie under
oath. The people who are likely to lie under oath do so based on two factors: "the
importance to them of having a falsehood believed and their confidence that their false
testimony will achieve that end with minimal risk."' 128 In light of the low probative
value of prior convictions in assessing truthfulness and the grave potential that jurors
will use them to determine guilt, it has been argued that prior conviction impeachment
can burden the constitutional right to testify. 29
120. Ed E. Gainor, Character Evidence by Any Other Name... : A Proposal to Limit
Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609,58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 762,762-63 (1990)
("There is nothing new about the observation that allowing impeachment by prior conviction
places a defendant who has previously been convicted of a crime at a serious disadvantage in a
criminal trial. Courts and commentators were in general agreement on this point before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
121. PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 3.09 (2005)
(brackets in original omitted).
122. See, e.g., People v. Hinton, 126 P.3d 981, 1006 (Cal. 2006) ("We presume the jury
followed the court's instructions.").
123. E.g., Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a
Theory ofJury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1231 (1998); Nancy
S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions Into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
449, 454-58 (2006); Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
159, 170 (1994); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?,
2006 Wis. L. REV. 739, 790-91 (2006).
124. Uphoff, supra note 123, at 790.
125. See Cordray, supra note 16, at 507.
126. Uviller, supra note 11, at 813.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Hornstein, supra note 12, at 46-61.
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These concerns with prior conviction impeachment were not lost on Congress. As
one scholar has said, "the extraordinary amount of congressional interest generated by
Rule 609(a) derived from the fact that the Rule significantly affects the outcome of
criminal trials."' 130 Indeed, though the congressional debate frequently appeared to
focus on the particulars of Rule 609, it actually was a "broad and ideological"
exchange about the proper balance between protecting criminal defendants' rights to a
fair trial and protecting the public from criminals.
13
C. Controversy Surrounding the Adoption of Rule 609
1. Legislative History-The "Great Compromise"
Rule 609 narrowly passed Congress and was supposedly a "compromise" between
the House and Senate versions of the rule.132 The rule was "hotly contested,' ' 33 and
prior to its passage, Rule 609 was the subject of extensive debate in Congress,
receiving more attention than any other proposed rule of evidence. 34 Indeed, there
were various versions of the rule before the enactment of the final version. Initially,
Rule 609 would have provided for the admission of all felony convictions and all
convictions involving "dishonesty" or a "false statement," regardless of whether they
were felonies or not.' 3 Notably, the first draft of the rule treated felonies and crimen
falsi (the crime of falsifying) the same, and likewise, the rule did not differentiate
between criminal defendants and ordinary witnesses. 136 Perhaps most importantly, the
initial rule provided no discretion for the trial judge to keep out convictions when the
potential for prejudice outweighed the probative value of the prior conviction.' 37 This
omission drew criticism, so the next version of the rule gave judges discretion to
exclude both crimen falsi crimes and general felonies. 38 But disapproval of this
version led Congress to change the rule back to its initial draft, thus giving judges no
discretion.' 39 Various other solutions were offered, and ultimately, the Conference
130. Gold, supra note 12, at 2297.
131. Id. at 2298.
132. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that Rule 609
was "unquestionably the product of careful deliberation and compromise"); McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 110, § 42, at 63; Gainor, supra note 120, at 763 (calling the adoption of
Rule 609 "the product of hard-fought political compromise"); Donald H. Ziegler, Harmonizing
Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635, 650-51
(noting that "[c]ommentators almost universally characterize the final versions of Rules 608(b)
and 609 as compromises" but also calling such characterizations "very charitable" and asserting
that Congress "copped out" with its version of these rules).
133. Smith, 551 F.2d at 360.
134. Homstein, supra note 12, at 6 ("The fierce debate surrounding adoption of [Rule 609]
as well as its subsequent history evidences some of that controversy."); see also Gold, supra
note 12, at 2302 (noting that "[t]he extent of the floor debate in the House over Rule 609(a) far
exceeded that relating to any other provision in all the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence").
135. Hornstein, supra note 12, at 6-7.
136. Id. at 6-7.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7-8.
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Committee came to a "compromise," which is embodied in the current version of Rule
609. 40 Crimen falsi crimes are per se admissible, and general felonies may be
admissible, subject to applicable balancing tests that weigh the probative value of the
conviction against the prejudice to the defendant.'14 In 2006, Congress amended Rule
609 to make it clear that crimen falsi crimes require, in the establishment of their
elements, proof of dishonesty or of a false statement to be per se admissible for
impeachment purposes. 142 Since its enactment, Rule 609 has been widely criticized by
scholars.
43
2. Was Rule 609 Really a Compromise?
The debate over Rule 609 turned into a debate about the need for crime prevention
and the need to protect criminal defendants' constitutional rights. Senator McClellan,
who was "a powerful member of the Judiciary Committee and an outspoken advocate
for prosecutorial interests," proposed a version of Rule 609 that would have rendered
all felony convictions admissible against a criminal defendant-with no exceptions and
with no judicial discretion to exclude prior convictions on the basis that the unfair
prejudice outweighed the probative value.144 Senator McClellan urged this proposed
rule, which would require absolute admission of prior convictions with no exceptions,
on behalf of himself and Senators Hruska, Roth, Talmadge, and Thurmond. Senator
McClellan argued forcefully against an alternate proposal that would have limited the
evidentiary use of prior convictions to only those crimes involving dishonesty and false
statements by a criminal defendant. 145 Senator McClellan stated the following on the
Senate floor:
We have gone pretty far already in trying to protect criminals and granting
every advantage to them against society. No one can deny that we provide every
legal and legitimate right to make certain that a defendant charged with crime has a
fair trial. And that aspect of the law should be defended and maintained. But why
should one who has already been convicted of rape or murder and is later being
tried for armed robbery, not be able to be questioned about his previous crimes, so
that a jury might properly evaluate the credibility of the testimony he is giving-
properly determine if he should be believed?'46
140. Id. at 8; see also FED. R. EviD. 609.
141. See FED. R. EvID. 609.
142. See FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2).
143. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 14, at 4 ("Current rules generally allowing prior
conviction evidence place a premium on efficiently convicting people."); Friedman, supra note
13, at 678 ("Character impeachment evidence of an accused has virtually no probative value
with respect to credibility, but its availability has tremendous prejudicial impact."); Abraham P.
Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a),
38 EMoRY L.J. 135, 137 (1989) ("Extrinsic crime evidence does weigh too heavily with the jury.
It causes the jury to prejudge the case and to deny the defendant a fair trial on the specific
charge in the indictment.").
144. Gold, supra note 12, at 2300, 2305.
145. 120 CONG. REc. 37,075-76 (1974).
146. Id. at 37,076 (emphasis added).
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Senator McClellan's argument at first blush might have seemed focused on prior
convictions as merely probative of credibility. However, as he continued with his
remarks advocating the absolute admission of all prior convictions, he seemed to be
concerned with more than just credibility determinations. He saw the use of prior
felonies-as against criminal defendants-as a means of protecting society:
Can it really be argued that the fact that a person has committed a serious
crime--a felony-has no bearing on whether he would be willing to lie to a jury?
Should ajury be denied that right? Should society be denied the opportunity, in
trying to protect itself, in its effort to discover the truth, to show that the witness
before it is a man who has committed such a crime and, therefore, might be willing
to now lie to a jury? I think not.147
Senator McClellan saw his proposed rule as "fair" because all witnesses were
treated the same under the rule. Moreover, he considered any further concessions to
"the criminal" to be unfair to society and a threat to "the general welfare."
Those witnesses who testified against him are also subject to the same test of
credibility.... But to give a blanket exclusion to a defendant charged with a
heinous crime from being challenged as to his credibility by being required to
answer whether he has been convicted of a felony is placing a burden on society
that it should not have to bear. It is an unwarranted and unjust shield for the
criminal to the disadvantage of society.
Mr. President, there is no justification in my judgment that could possibly
warrant our making the precipitous change proposed in this bill-a change that
can only weaken our efforts at law enforcement. It cannot result in perfecting
society. It cannot result in promoting the general welfare. It will serve only, Mr.
President, to give further advantage to and to enhance the opportunity for
convicted criminals to escape justice, by not permitting a jury to know of their
criminal conduct and convictions in the past. I hope this amendment will be
adopted. 141
Surely a person who has committed a serious crime-a felony-will just as readily
lie under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor involving lying.
Would a convicted rapist, cold-blooded murderer or armed robber really hesitate
to lie under oath any more than a person who has previously lied? Would a
convicted murderer or robber be more truthful than such a person?
Of course not!
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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The fact that a person has committed such a serious offense in the past clearly
bears on whether he would lie under oath where his life or liberty was in
jeopardy.14
9
Interestingly, the final draft of Rule 609 is often touted as a "compromise" between
those who proposed the admission of crimes involving false statement or dishonesty
only and those who advocated for the per se admission of all felonies with no judicial
discretion. In reality, however, those who adopted Senator McClellan's way of thinking
gained the most in the so-called compromise. Despite the discretion thatjudges have to
exclude prior convictions of criminal defendants, they routinely admit these
convictions to impeach defendants. It has been determined that over seventy percent of
criminal defendants who testify at their trials are impeached with evidence of their
prior conviction.' 50 While this number does not tell us the percentage of testifying
defendants who actually have prior convictions, over seventy percent is a relatively
high figure in and of itself. One can reasonably assume that there are testifying criminal
defendants who do not have criminal records and for whom Rule 609 is not an issue.
As a result, the percentage of defendants who receive the benefit ofjudicial discretion
to exclude their prior convictions is likely quite low.
The reality is that defendants are routinely impeached with their prior convictions at
trial.151 Some courts have even admitted prior convictions against the criminal
defendant without bothering to balance the probative value against the prejudicial
impact or after improperly placing the burden of establishing prejudice on the
defendant. 15 2 Given the broad discretion that trial courts enjoy under Rule 609 to admit
or exclude evidence, some appellate courts have deemed trial courts' balancing
determinations "virtually unreviewable."'
153
3. Reconsidering the Historical Development of the Prior Conviction Impeachment
Rule in Its Social Context
The various studies highlighted later in this Article will demonstrate that the
criminal justice system frequently uses race as evidence of bad character. 154 In some
ways, what is most unfortunate about this use of race-particularly as it relates to Rule
609-is that there is nothing new about it. As discussed in Part II.A, during the same
time period when Rule 609 was being developed, competency rules that prohibited
testimony by convicted felons, criminal defendants, and Blacks were abandoned. It is
149. Id. at 37,076-77 (emphasis added).
150. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1449, 1461 (2005) (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 147 tbl.44
(1966)).
15 1. See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 55, 59 (1994) (noting that prior convictions are "routinely" used in common
law jurisdictions); Greenawalt, supra note 108, at 45 (noting that there are various aspects of
our criminal justice system that "threaten convictions of the innocent," including the "routine
introduction of prior convictions to impeach defendants").
152. Gold, supra note 12, at 2322-23.
153. Id. at 2324.
154. See infra Part III.C.
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important to note that there was substantial overlap between convicted felons, criminal
defendants, and Blacks. 15 5 The abandonment of rules excluding convicted felons' and
criminal defendants' testimony came with a cost to those persons who could then be
impeached with their prior convictions.m5 6 It cannot be ignored that Blacks at that time
made up a disproportionate share of the convicted felon and criminal defendant
populations.
Professor Fisher draws an interesting racial link to the "explosion" of northern
jurisdictions that abandoned the old competency rules with respect to criminal
defendants after the Civil War.15 7 Professor Fisher argues that northern states started
the trend of allowing criminal defendants to testify in the 1860s to avoid arguments
from southern states that they were hypocrites in demanding that southern states
abandon their exclusion of Blacks from testifying in trials while still holding on to their
own competency rules barring criminal defendants from testifying. 5 8 The justice
system historically placed Blacks in essentially the same category as criminal
defendants--"the most likely liars of all"159-and convicted felons; and the ability of
criminal defendants to testify came about, in significant part, because of the rules that
allowed Blacks to testify. The racial link in at least one southern state, for example,
reflected notions of White supremacy, even the supremacy of a White criminal above a
Black person. By liberalizing state competency rules against everyone, including
criminal defendants, South Carolina legislators "protected even accused [White]
criminals from [the] perceived ignominy" of ever being forced to sit silently while a
Black person testified against him.16° Eventually, of course, no White person in the
United States, even a criminal defendant, would have to deal with this "ignominy."
To many, during both the antebellum and post-Civil War periods, Blacks and crime
were synonymous. Historically, race was used in constructing criminality, both in terms
of defining crimes and enforcing criminal law.' 6' This construction of criminality was
part of "[W]hite efforts to effectively criminalize and punish the very condition of
being [B]lack.' 16
2
Indeed, during the post-Civil War period, there was a disproportionate number of
Blacks in the criminal justice system, particularly in the South. The rapid
criminalization of Blacks was fueled in large part by the "convict leasing" system,
whereby "the Southern court system operated as an employment agency for [W]hite
plantation owners, making the state-enforced bonded labor of [B]lacks and the prison
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 252 (2002).
157. Fisher, supra note 76, at 696-97.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 662.
160. Id. at 696.
161. See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & PoL'"
REV. 9, 16 (1999) (observing that "[tihe development of criminal justice policy suggests that
racial considerations are of major consequence when it comes to formulating responses to illegal
behavior" and noting, for example, that "[t]he history of national policy in regard to marijuana is
clear in this regard").
162. R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 861 (2004).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
system enormously profitable."' 163 In the South, "[a]fter emancipation, the jailhouse
became a [B]lack preserve," and "[o]ver ninety percent of the convicts were
[B]lack."'164 The formal institution of slavery was systematically replaced by the penal
system. Observers "had long lamented that the operations of the criminal justice system
affected [Blacks] disproportionately" and believed that "[t]he end of the Civil War
could only exacerbate matters."'
165
In Massachusetts, for example, the state prison warden publicly expressed his
concern that there would be "a northward immigration of poor, unskilled freed slaves
who would overburden the state's penal institutions."' 66 Permitting criminal defendants
and convicted felons to testify after the Civil War also meant permitting a substantial
number of Blacks to testify. Perhaps this is another reason why southern states might
have seen hypocrisy in northern states' taking pride in abandoning rules excluding
Blacks from testifying while maintaining their rules that kept criminal defendants and
convicted felons off of the witness stand.
The liberation of the competency rules for criminal defendants, a disproportionate
number of whom were Black, would prove to be illusory at any rate because they could
be impeached with their prior convictions. For example, in Taylor v. State167 _a case
decided not long after the abandonment of the competency rules-a Black defendant
was impeached with his prior record and ultimately sentenced to death. Though the
trial judge instructed the jury that they could not consider the defendant's prior record
for any purpose other than assessing his credibility, he allowed the county attorney to
argue the following:
"I am well enough acquainted with this class of niggers to know that they have got
it in for the race in their heart, and in their hearts call them all [W]hite sons of
bitches."
... "The only punishment you can give this negro bully is to end his earthly
career. If you send him to the penitentiary, it will not reform him. He has been in
the penitentiary for assault to murder, and it has had no effect on him. And he goes
out the first thing and gets a big six-shooter, and goes to killing. He has been tried
in the penitentiary, and that does no good, and you must not give him another
chance in the penitentiary, for, if you do, he will watch his opportunity to kill the
guards and escape."'
168
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and
sentence, finding that the trial court "should not only have reprimanded the counsel,
but should have charged the jury to totally disregard such argument."' 169 Even though
163. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 1026-27 (2002).
164. Melvin Gutterman, "Failure to Communicate": The Reel Prison Experience, 55 SMU
L. REv. 1515, 1528 (2002) (citing Matthew J. Mancini, Race, Economics, and theAbandonment
of Convict Leasing, 63 J. NEGRO HIST. 339, 339, 343 (1978)).
165. Fisher, supra note 76, at 691 (citation omitted).
166. Id
167. 100 S.W. 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907).
168. Id. at 393.
169. Id
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the appellate court ultimately reversed and ordered a new trial, the case is disturbing in
that the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to appeal to fears of Black violence, to paint
the defendant as a "negro bully" who was a career criminal with no chance of
rehabilitation, and to claim that the defendant could only be stopped by imposing the
death penalty. Also disturbing is the appellate court's suggestion that a mere limiting
instruction would have cured the error.170 This case demonstrates that in the intensely
hostile climate for Blacks during the post-Civil War period, the rule that permitted
Black criminal defendants to testify, subject to impeachment by their prior records,
could only help reinforce the social control of Blacks through the criminal justice
system.
Though the racial climate was not as openly hostile as in the days of Taylor v. State,
the stereotype of the Black criminal-so deeply ingrained in the American psyche-
was very much alive in 1975 when Rule 609 was adopted. So when Senator McClellan
made his impassioned plea to adopt Rule 609 in its most restrictive form, with no
judicial discretion and in order to protect society from the criminal elements, i.e.,
"them," 71 one must keep in mind that most people at that time-as is true today-saw
a Black face when they thought about the criminal element in society. Indeed, such
pleas by politicians have often been seen as appeals to racial bias, "rhetorical winks,"
as sociologist Jerry Himelstein has called them, referring to politicians' use of such
rhetoric with race and class undertones. 72 In political and social dialogue,
"conversations about welfare or crime are freighted with racial innuendo and
resentment."1
73
Sentencing and related criminal justice policies that are ostensibly "race neutral"
have in fact been seen over many years to have clear racial effects that could have
been anticipated by legislators prior to enactment. In some instances, the purported
race neutrality has merely been a thin cover for racial intent.
174
Rule 609 was passed during an era that saw the rapid proliferation of "get tough" on
crime laws, which resulted in the mass incarceration of hundreds of thousands of
persons, mostly minorities. 1
75
As discussed above, scholars have roundly criticized Rule 609 for the dilemma that
it poses for criminal defendants. Despite the richness of the scholarship in this area,
there is a striking void in that there is no in-depth consideration of the current race
implications of the prior conviction impeachment of criminal defendants. Because of
this void, the current collective critique of Rule 609 is largely incomplete. Where a rule
170. Id. at 394.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
172. Lani Guinier, Clinton Spoke the Truth on Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1993, at A29.
173. Id.
174. Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 28 (2007).
175. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE. ON CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERSHP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND,
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RACIAL DIsPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21-23,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/cj/Justice.pdf (discussing the 'tough on crime'
movement of the past several decades" and noting that it has "led to incarceration rates for
minorities far out of proportion to their percentage of the U.S. population").
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has a disproportionate impact on a certain group, there must be a consideration of how
the rule operates from the perspective of that group.
Based on the disproportionate impact alone, Rule 609 has harsh consequences for
the Black community. Notably, in an essay on the judicial process, racism, and actual
innocence, Judge Stephen Fortunato of the Rhode Island Superior Court pointed out
the disproportionate impact of Rule 609 on Black defendants: "While the admission of
a prior record hurts a defendant, whatever his color, Blacks wishing to testify in their
own defense in a criminal trial are more disadvantaged as a group than [W]hites." 7 6
Judge Fortunato's observation is an excellent starting place, as the studies are clear
that Black defendants are more likely than Whites to have a criminal record. But there
is more to the race problem of Rule 609 than just its disproportionate impact. To
understand how Rule 609 both reflects and shapes the evidentiary meaning of
character, we must look at why Blacks are more likely to have a criminal record than
Whites. The racial disparity studies that I discuss in Part III have an underlying thread
that connects them. That thread is character.
Misperceptions about the inherent character of Blacks lead to disparities in the way
they are treated in the criminal justice system. Rule 609 then becomes a part of the
cycle of the mischaracterization of Blacks. Rule 609 accepts, without question, the
criminalization of a substantially disproportionate segment of the population based on
perceptions of their character and serves to sustain this systemic mischaracterization.
What is not overtly stated in the legislative history of Rule 609 or in the scholarly
commentary about Rule 609 is that when most people think of the stereotypical
"criminal," regardless of their race, a Black face comes to mind.177 Rule 609
perpetuates the belief that blackness equates bad character. As discussed above, the
theory underlying the rule is that persons with certain prior convictions-those serious
enough to be considered felonies in most jurisdictions or those involving dishonesty or
false statement-are dishonest. This underlying theory is consistent with the historical
stereotype of Blacks as dishonest.'
78
Rule 609 effectively permits juries to find that because the defendant previously
committed a crime, he is a "bad" person generally. Thus, the more realistic evidentiary
use of prior convictions under Rule 609 is as general character evidence. This use of
the rule is also consistent with the idea that Blacks tend to have overall bad character.
D. Is Rule 609 Really a Problem for Criminal Defendants?
Judge Fortunato's comments regarding the disproportionate effect of Rule 609 on
Blacks is significant as a practical matter, given his perspective from the bench. 179 His
observations provide powerful evidence about the day-to-day practical impact of Rule
609 on criminal defendants, particularly Blacks. But putting race issues aside for a
moment, one might wonder about the role that Rule 609 actually plays in practice on a
day-to-day basis in the criminal justice system as a general matter. Does the existence
176. Stephen J. Fortunato, Judges, Racism, and the Problem ofActual Innocence, 57 ME. L.
REv. 481, 505 (2005).
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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of Rule 609, though often criticized by scholars, have much of an impact as a practical
matter? The answer is an unqualified "yes."
1. Effect on Plea Bargaining
Of course, it is widely known that the vast majority of criminal cases do not go to
trial. In fact, around ninety-five percent of criminal defendants enter guilty pleas.
80
Because Rule 609 is a rule that governs in the event of a trial, one may wonder about
its impact as a practical matter. Though criminal trials are relatively few and far
between, Rule 609 is nevertheless an important rule-even outside of the courtroom.
As any good litigator knows, the rules of evidence are important not only at trial but
also, and perhaps more so, during the pretrial stage of a case. Knowing beforehand the
likelihood that certain information will or will not be admissible aids significantly in
evaluating the strength of a case. Indeed, available data and common experience
demonstrate that Rule 609 is a very real threat to criminal defendants with prior
records, one that they consider-and which is often at the forefront of their minds-in
deciding whether or not to go to trial. The real fear of being impeached dissuades
defendants from taking the stand if they go to trial and, in a number of cases, from even
going to trial at all.
In recounting the history of plea bargaining, Professor George Fisher notes that
"[t]he upshot [of] a law that purported to grant defendants a new right to testify at trial
instead deprived those defendants who had criminal records of the right to any
meaningful trial, and left them with little alternative but to seek the best plea bargain
they could get.' 81 Fisher observes that "[t]he dramatic conversion to a plea bargaining
regime" began a relatively short period after defendants gained the right to testify and,
in turn, gained the risk of impeachment with their prior convictions. 182 Indeed, the
criminal defendant impeachment rules serve as "strong allies" that aid in promoting the
plea bargaining system.' 83 Empirical evidence also demonstrates that whether a
defendant has a prior conviction is among the crucial considerations that a criminal
defendant and her lawyer take into account when deciding whether to forgo a trial and
to accept a plea agreement.
1 84
2. Effect on Decision to Testify
Should they decide to take their chances and go to trial, defendants with prior
criminal records face the dilemma of whether to testify and tell their story or to sit
silently while other trial participants develop the story without them. And silent
180. Natapoff, supra note 150, at 1462 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 416 tbl.5.17, 448 tbl.5.46 (2002),
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/archive.html).
181. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 107 (2003).
182. Id. at 109.
183. Id.
184. DEBORAH S. EMMELMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A STUDY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE WORK
41(2003).
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criminal defendants must face the fact that jurors want to hear a narrative.'85 In fact,
studies have shown that the narrative aspect of trials is of paramount importance.'
8 6
[T]rials are essentially "story-battle[s]."... The jurors then compare their own
stories with those offered by the parties. The side who can offer a story which the
juror accepts as the "best" explanation of the evidence presented, and the closest
match to his or her own narrative, will win the juror's vote in the end.'8 7
Thus, jurors construct their own stories and compare them to those that the prosecution
and defense presented. They base their comparisons in part on what they believe makes
a "complete story."' 8 In the end, "[t]he defendant's ability to tell the right story-and
to tell it completely-is a powerful influence on the outcome of a trial and thus central
to the protection of his constitutional right to present a complete defense."'' 8 9 Rule 609
greatly diminishes the criminal defendant's ability to present a narrative, or at least a
believable narrative, to the jury. 90 A criminal defendant who is unable to make his
own "contribution" to the jury's constructed narrative is at a significant disadvantage.
The United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, guarantees
criminal defendants the right to testify in their own defense. Specifically, the Supreme
Court has stated that "[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of
the Sixth Amendment, . . . the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." ' 19' Facing the very real
likelihood that the prosecution will use their prior convictions to impeach them, many
defendants simply remain silent. 192 This fact severely undermines criminal defendants'
constitutional right to testify in their own defense. Indeed, it has even been argued that
this forced silence is antithetical to the high value that our democracy places on speech
and freedom of expression.1
93
A recent article by Professor John Blume provides empirical data that impeachment
through prior convictions is of great concern to criminal defendants, even deterring
defendants who are later proven to be factually innocent from testifying on their own
185. John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story:
Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1069, 1087-91 (2007).
186. See id. ("It is now widely accepted, and empirical research demonstrates, that narrative
plays an important role throughout the entire trial process.... [J]urors organize and interpret
trial evidence as they receive it by placing it into a story format . .
187. Id. at 1089.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 1091.
190. See Natapoff, supra note 150, at 1461 (noting that Rules 609 and 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence "threaten the defendant's ability to be heard by the jury. Past crimes and bad
acts impair credibility, and make the defendant a less believable storyteller").
191. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (citations omitted)).
192. See Natapoff, supra note 150, at 1462 (explaining that prior criminal histories work to
silence defendants who choose to "keep quiet" rather than subject themselves to the prejudice
associated with their prior convictions).
193. See id at 1449-57.
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behalf.194 Professor Blume studied cases in which individuals were convicted and later
exonerated because of DNA evidence. He found that "demonstrably innocent
defendants do not testify in their own defense at substantially different rates than
criminal defendants in general" and that "[v]irtually all of the defendants who did not
testify had a prior record which would have been disclosed to the jury had they taken
the stand."' 95 Either the defendants or their lawyers (or both) justifiably believed that
once the jurors heard about their prior convictions, they were more likely to convict
them on the basis that "the defendant is the type of person who would have done it.'
196
Blume's data has led him to "conclude that the current rules of evidence contribute to
wrongful convictions."'197
Thus, Rule 609, which is a powerful tool in a prosecutor's arsenal, has a tremendous
impact in the criminal justice system. The power of Rule 609 generally, coupled with
its impact from a race standpoint, makes it all the more important to explore its
reliability.
III. THE UNRELIABILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Because Rule 609 gives evidentiary value to race through its reliance on a racially
biased criminal justice system, it is helpful to look to evidentiary principles to evaluate
the soundness of the prior conviction impeachment practice. The racial bias that is
inherent in the practice sets up an interesting evidentiary problem that scholars have
not considered up to this point. The Black tax in the entire criminal process operates
unjustifiably to criminalize Blacks, whereas the White credit operates unjustifiably to
redeem White criminals. The fact that these racially based taxes influence the
convictions used for impeachment suggests that the convictions, and more importantly,
the system through which they were obtained, are an unreliable source from which to
determine character.
The unreliability of prior convictions as means to assess character significantly
reduces their probative value for impeachment purposes. The fact that Blacks are likely
to face even more prejudice than Whites when impeached with their prior convictions
compounds the unreliability problem with prior conviction impeachment. These
problems raise serious due process issues with respect to the use of prior convictions to
impeach Black defendants. I will explore these due process concerns in Part IV.
In this Part, I establish that prior convictions are a form of hearsay and that the
exceptions that allow for their admissibility to impeach unjustifiably presume the
reliability of the convictions. I then show that the justice system under which Blacks
are convicted in this country is not a reliable "hearsay declarant," particularly with
respect to assessing character. I demonstrate how misperceptions of character based'on
race influence the pretrial process and the presentation and adjudication of cases that
actually do go to trial. I also take a closer look at two issues that are particularly
troubling from a race and perception standpoint: drug offenses and the juvenile justice
194. John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a PriorRecord-Lessons
from the Wrongfully Convicted 1, 3-4, 15-20 (Comell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 07-017, 2007), available at http://Isr.nellco.org/comelillsrp/papers/83/.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id. at 3-4.
197. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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system. These two aspects of the criminal justice system play a large and largely unfair
role in the construction of Black criminality.
A. Recognizing Prior Convictions as Hearsay
Prior convictions are hearsay. 198 The definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of
Evidence is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,"' 199 Stated
another way, hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. A prior judgment used in the impeachment context fits the classic
definition of hearsay. 200 It is a statement, or assertion, that was made by another court,
that is, the declarant, outside of the current proceedings. 20 1 Additionally, when used to
impeach in the Rule 609 context, a prior judgment is offered to prove that the witness,
often the defendant-witness, was convicted and in fact committed the underlying crime
for which he is being impeached.
One might argue that prior convictions admitted under Rule 609 are admitted for
impeachment purposes and not for the truth of the matter asserted. Stated another way,
the argument might go that it is the very fact of conviction that impeaches, and the
"statement" that the criminal system makes regarding the underlying conduct is
irrelevant. Even though Rule 609 ultimately allows for impeachment, "it is the
underlying conduct that impeaches." 20 2 Rule 609, therefore, is an exception to the
hearsay rule. 20 3 Rule 609 does not expressly state that it is an exception to the hearsay
198. E.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REv. 979,980-91
(1986) (noting that prior judgments, including prior criminal convictions, are hearsay).
199. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
200. See, e.g., Ronald N. Boyce & Edward L. Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983-Part
III, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 717, 799-800 ("While Rule 609 allows proof of convictions to impeach,
it is the underlying conduct that impeaches. In that sense Rule 609 is de facto an additional
exception to the hearsay rule.").
201. See id.
202. Id. at 799.
203. See Miguel A. Mendez, Comparing the Federal Rules ofEvidence with the California
Evidence Code-Proposition 8 and the Wisdom of Using Initiatives as a RulemakingDevice, 36
Sw. U. L. REv. 571, 583 (2008) ("Impeachment by convictions implicates the hearsay rule
because of their value as evidence of a witness's character for lack of veracity."); Miguel A.
Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REv. 569, 594 (2004) (explaining
that "when the records are offered to prove the misconduct underlying the conviction, the
hearsay rule is seriously implicated because multiple layers of hearsay are involved");
Motomura, supra note 198, at 980-91 (noting the prior judgments, including prior convictions,
are hearsay); Roger C. Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 Miss. C. L. REv.
125, 133 (1995) (discussing a statute prohibiting persons convicted of a felony from carrying a
gun and noting that "evidence of the conviction is hearsay when offered to show that the
convicted person actually committed the crime that led to conviction"). Outside the
impeachment context, the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly recognize prior convictions as
hearsay. Under a specific hearsay exception in the Federal Rules, Rule 803(22), prior
convictions are admissible in criminal and civil trials. This rule specifically permits the
admission of evidence of prior convictions, with the exception of those resulting from nolo
contendere pleas, in civil and criminal cases to prove "any fact essential to sustain the
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rule, but such an express statement is wholly unnecessary. In the Federal Rules of
Evidence, certain rules operate as exceptions to more general ones and do not
expressly state that they are exceptions in other instances.
2 04
At any rate, to understand why Rule 609 is an exception to the general rule against
hearsay, also consider that Rule 609 is an express exception to Rule 404, which bans
the use of character evidence to show that someone acted in conformity with his or her
character on a particular occasion. Rule 404 specifically states that "[e]vidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except... [e]vidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. ' '2°5 As a result, the
probative value of a prior conviction under Rule 609 is not in the conviction itself but
in what that conviction says about the convicted person's character. Thus, it is indeed
"the underlying conduct that impeaches," not the person's mere status as a convicted
felon.2
0 6
In People v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court observed that California's
version of the prior felony conviction impeachment rule, which parallels Rule 609, is in
fact an exception to the rule against hearsay.20 7 And because the California prior
conviction impeachment rule provided for the admissibility of felonies only, the court
held that there was no exception to the hearsay rule for prior misdemeanor convictions
and that such convictions are inadmissible.20 8 The court rejected the government's
argument that the fact of conviction itself, and not the underlying conduct, was the
relevant aspect for impeachment purposes.2 09 The court observed that "[a]nalytically, a
judgment that is offered to prove the matters determined by the judgment is hearsay
evidence. It is in substance a statement of the court that determined the previous action
[i.e., other than by a testifying witness] ... that is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated.
210
B. Race and the Unreliability of Prior Convictions
1. Back to Basics: The Testimonial Infirmities of the Hearsay Declarant
The general rule against the admission of hearsay in criminal and civil trials is well
established. The theory underlying the hearsay rule is that it is far more reliable to have
live testimony that is subject to cross-examination than to have hearsay testimony. The
hearsay rule is, therefore, concerned with reliability.
judgment." FED. R. EviD. 803(22).
204. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413-15 (allowing inquiry into specific instances of certain
sexual misconduct without noting that doing so is an exception to Rule 405's directive that, in
cases where character evidence is admissible against an accused, inquiry is limited to reputation
and opinion evidence on direct examination).
205. FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
206. Boyce & Kimball, supra note 200, at 799.
207. 841 P.2d 938, 947 (Cal. 1993).
208. Id. ("There can be no doubt that the hearsay objection to use of misdemeanor
convictions remains valid.").
209. Id.
210. Id. at 946 (citation omitted in original).
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As Professor Laurence Tribe stated in his well-known piece, Triangulating
Hearsay, "[t]he basic hearsay problem is that of forging a reliable chain of inferences,
from an act or utterance of a person not subject to contemporaneous in-court cross-
examination about that act or utterance, to an event that the act or utterance is supposed
to reflect.",211 Professor Tribe conceptualized these inferences in his famous
"testimonial triangle."
212
In the first "link" of inferences that are made with respect to hearsay, we are
concerned with what was actually on the declarant's mind when she made the utterance
or acted.213 We are concerned in the second link with the accuracy of the declarant's
beliefs in relation to the reality of the external event about which she spoke.214 We are
able to test these inferences for possible inaccuracies when a witness testifies in
215court. However, if the declarant's utterance or act is brought out in a manner other
than through her testimony at trial under oath, then a process is being undertaken that
"has long been regarded as particularly suspect."216 The trier of fact is unable to
observe the declarant under oath and cannot consider her demeanor and her verbal and
nonverbal reactions to the conditions of cross-examination.
The hearsay rule is concerned with the inability to test evidence through cross-
examination. Indeed, cross-examination has been deemed the most effective tool
available for truth-seeking. Wigmore remarked that cross-examination is "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. ' ,2 17 Courts have also recognized
the power and importance of cross-examination. For example, one state supreme court
noted that cross-examination "is a safeguard essential to a fair trial and a cornerstone in
the quest for truth. 218
As a matter of constitutional law, the Sixth Amendment embodies the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination in criminal cases. But the United States Supreme
Court has said that "[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.",219 The Court has further observed that the rights of confrontation
and cross-examination "have ancient roots" and that the Court is "zealous to protect
these rights from erosion" not just in criminal cases, but in "all types of cases where
administrative actions [are] under scrutiny., 220
Cross-examination is so crucial because it tests for inaccuracies in testimony that
can arise from four important "testimonial infirmities": ambiguity, insincerity, faulty
perception, and erroneous memory. 221 Evidence from an out of court hearsay declarant
simply cannot be tested for these infirmities.
211. Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974).
212. Id. at 958-59.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 5 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1974).
218. Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1987).
219. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)).
221. Tribe, supra note 211, at 958.
[Vol. 84:521
2009] A RACE CRITIQUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT 557
As any law student who has studied evidence knows, there are a plethora of
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay. For the most part, these exceptions exist
because they pertain to the types of statements made under circumstances that are
thought to provide some assurances of reliability and trustworthiness.222 For example,
there is a well-known exception for "excited utterances." 223 Under this exception,
statements that the declarant made while he was still under the stress or excitement of
an event will be admissible. 224 Similarly, there is an exception for so-called "dying
declarations. 225 Under this exception, statements that a declarant makes while
believing that his death is imminent are admissible. 226 The theory underlying these
sorts of exceptions is that they were made under circumstances that assure their
reliability. The theory assumes that people who are under the stress or excitement of an
event or what they think is their impending death are less likely to be insincere in their
statements. 227 An additional exception exists for "present sense impressions," which
covers statements made while the declarant perceives an event or occurrence. 228 The
contemporaneous nature of such statements is thought to ensure accuracy in
perception.
229
As Professor Tribe notes, some exceptions exist because there are assurances of
reliability with respect to "one leg" in the testimonial triangle, which is "thought to
reduce the triangle's weaknesses so substantially that the balance of untrustworthiness
and likelihood of probative value favors admissibility of the evidence." 230 In these
instances, "one good leg is enough.",231 Thus, the assurances of reliability with respect
to perception may be strong enough to overcome the other testimonial infirmities.
The underlying justification for the hearsay exception for prior convictions23 2 is that
criminal convictions are deemed "reliable and trustworthy," given the various checks in
the criminal process.233 The assumption is that, in the prior proceedings, the accused
had every incentive to defend the case vigorously.2 34 After all, his freedom was at
stake, as was his reputation due to the stigma attached to a criminal conviction.
Additionally, because criminal trials are subject to the taxing beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, prior convictions are presumed to be accurate.235 Even the process and
procedures for obtaining guilty pleas are assumed to have adequate protections in place
to ensure the integrity of the conviction. As a result, convictions resulting from guilty
222. See id. at 965-69.
223. FED. R. EvID. 803(2); see also Tribe, supra note 211, at 969.
224. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
225. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2).
226. Id.; see also Tribe, supra note 211, at 966-69.
227. Tribe, supra note 211, at 966-67.
228. FED. R. EvD. 803(1).
229. Tribe, supra note 211, at 965.
230. Id. at 964.
231. Id. at 966 (emphasis omitted).
232. FED. R. EvD. 803(22).
233. Motomura, supra note 198, at 988-89.
234. Id. at 989.
235. Id.; see also People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938, 946 (Cal. 1992) (stating that a prior
felony conviction is "peculiarly reliable" because of the "seriousness of the charge," and the
reasonable doubt standard will ensure "full litigation" such that "the question of guilt will be
thoroughly considered").
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
pleas are also deemed reliable enough to overcome the hearsay rule and can be used to
impeach.236
No one has ever really challenged the reliability of prior convictions; it has simply
been assumed, for the reasons discussed above, that such prior judgments by previous
courts are inherently reliable. The mounting evidence of substantial racial bias in the
criminal justice system, however, necessitates that these assumptions be challenged.
When study after study demonstrates that Blacks are targeted far more often than
Whites, are charged with more serious crimes than Whites, and are more likely than
Whites to be introduced to the adult criminal system as juveniles, we must consider
whether continued blind faith in the criminal justice system is really warranted. The
badly fractured system has left the hearsay exception for prior conviction impeachment
without a leg to stand on.
2. Multiple Layers of Hearsay
A prior conviction is a judgment from a previous court, and it represents that court's
pronouncement about the guilt of the convicted person.237 But the conviction itself
relies on multiple pronouncements from various officials and other participants in the
criminal process. In crimes involving victims, the system relies on assertions from
victims about their perpetrators. The system also relies on the statements of witnesses
other than the victims in determining what has occurred and in reconstructing the story
of the crime.
The system, of course, relies heavily on police. Police make pronouncements on a
daily basis that set series of events in motion, ultimately leading to convictions. With
regard to traffic stops, they decide whose behavior is suspicious and who needs to be
stopped. They then decide who to pursue further and who to let go with just a warning.
Their actions are all assertions about what constitutes criminality and criminal
behavior.
Prosecutors make pronouncements in deciding what cases to prosecute and the
severity of the charges in a particular case. Judges make pronouncements in their
dealings with criminal defendants before then-including whether there is sufficient
evidence for a criminal case to proceed, whether to accept a plea agreement, and the
final sentence. In cases that actually go to trial, jurors are most often the ultimate
determiners of whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. Moreover, legislatures are in
a sense hearsay declarants in their construction of criminal statutes, particularly those
that have a disparate impact on specific groups of people.
Thus, the criminal process is a complex one in which many declarants' statements
or nonverbal assertions may ultimately lead to conviction. And all along the way, there
is a very real likelihood that a particular declarant's misperceptions based on race
biases caused her to make certain statements or assertions. As discussed above, the
hearsay rule is based on concerns with the testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, faulty
memory, insincerity, and perception.238 Based on the studies that I discussed above and
on other race critiques of the criminal justice system, perception, or misperception,
236. Motomura, supra note 198, at 989.
237. See FED. R. EvID. 803(22).
238. See supra text accompanying note 221.
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tends to be the infirmity that invades the criminal process most often. I do not mean to
say that the other infirmities are inapplicable; indeed, perception problems based on
race can lead to problems of ambiguity, faulty memory, and insincerity. Unfortunately,
intentional racism still exists and can lead to the untrustworthiness of convictions, but it
seems that perception is at the root of the race bias problem in the criminal process.
C. Perception, Race, and Prior Convictions
As Professor Tribe notes, the inability to test the hearsay declarant's perception of
the event he is speaking about presents one of the problems with hearsay.239 A hearsay
declarant may speak about an event that he misperceives. Without in-court cross-
examination, we cannot effectively expose this infirmity to the jury. When a defendant
is impeached with his prior conviction, the jury will simply find out that the defendant
has a prior felony conviction and the name of the crime for which the defendant was
convicted.
Juries ordinarily do not hear about the various biases in the criminal process. This is
particularly problematic for a Black defendant with a prior record. A jury may not
realize that the legislature has constructed Black criminality through the creation of
laws, such as those discussed below dealing with drug offenses. 240 Moreover, jurors
may not realize that the enforcement of criminal statutes often operates in a way that
constructs Black criminality.
Also, there may have been witness and juror perception problems that led to the
Black defendant's prior conviction. Both White witnesses and White jurors expect
criminals to be Black.241 Thus, in the case of a violent crime involving a White victim
and a Black defendant, a White witness might remember the Black person to be the
aggressor in an episode in which the White person was actually the aggressor.
242
Professor Dorothy Roberts has noted that "[t]he unconscious association between
[B]lacks and crime is so powerful that it supersedes reality: it predisposes [W]hites to
literally see [B]lack people as criminals. '243 Prior conviction impeachment, with its
blind reliance on the hearsay declarants, will never expose this phenomenon of race-
based misperception to a jury.
Additionally, the presumed reliability of prior convictions does not take into
account the reality of the plea-bargaining machine, which mass produces convictions in
an assembly line fashion. One judge candidly admitted that racial bias can seep into the
day-to-day grind of keeping the massive plea bargaining machine going:
239. Tribe, supra note 211, at 958.
240. See infra Part IV.C.3.
241. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Error in Criminal Cases, 69 CoRNELL
L. REv. 934, 950-51 (1984); see also R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine andDiscourse, 48 UCLAL. REV. 1075, 1103-04 (2001)
(noting that "stereotypes and expectancies might systematically bias patterns of misperception
such that victims are more likely to erroneously implicate a racial minority as a criminal
perpetrator than to erroneously implicate a [Wihite"); Roberts, supra note 45, at 1953-54
(discussing cross-racial identification and noting that Blacks are disproportionately
misidentified, in part, because of "[W]hite witnesses' presumption of [B]lack criminality").
242. Johnson, supra note 241, at 950.
243. Roberts, supra note 45, at 1954 (emphasis in original).
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There's great pressure to say: "Look, we have time for X cases today, and
the calendar has X plus 200. We're going to have to hurry. Go out and
deal"... . In that process, it is certainly possible that preconceived notions
and misconceptions and stereotypes can creep in.2
It is important to note that the misperception problem with prior convictions also
operates in a way that can mislead jurors about White defendants and White witnesses.
If a White defendant or a White witness does not have a prior record, the jury will
assume that the person has led an honorable life and is worthy of belief. This is at least
consistent with the theory underlying the practice of prior conviction impeachment,
which states that a jury might be misled into thinking that the witness is trustworthy
without this impeachment method. White credit in the criminal justice system, then,
misleads juries who evaluate the testimony of White defendants and other White
witnesses. A White defendant who has managed, because of the White credit, to keep
his record clean-at least to this point-will likely be viewed quite differently from a
Black defendant who has had numerous run-ins with the law because of the Black tax.
In short, race has become evidence through Rule 609, and it is unreliable evidence.
Below, I explore specific areas that highlight and expose the race perception
problem in the criminal justice system. Specifically, I consider pretrial processing and
the trial setting. I also give special consideration to the race issues surrounding drug
laws as well as the juvenile justice system.
1. Pretrial Processing
A felony conviction is the culmination of a number of events that occur during the
pretrial process. Studies have demonstrated that a substantial amount of the system's
racial bias manifests in the pretrial process. These studies have shown "consistent and
substantial evidence that Black and Latino defendants receive less beneficial pretrial
decisions than do White defendants with similar legal characteristics. '245 In fact, "[t]he
available evidence suggests that disparities at this stage of criminal processing may be
larger and more consistent than disparities in sentencing.
' 246
In 2007, the Justice Department released a national study analyzing traffic stops,
finding that police are more likely to search Black and Hispanic drivers.247 In 2005,
police across the country stopped around eighteen million drivers, finding evidence of
criminal activity in twelve percent of their searches.248 The study found that while
police stopped Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics at "similar rates," disparities in treatment
244. Christopher H. Schmitt, Plea Bargaining Favors Whites as Blacks, Hispanics Pay
Price, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 8, 1991, at 1A (quoting Alameda County Superior Court
Judge Ken Kawaichi).
245. Traci Schlesinger, The Cumulative Effects ofRacial Disparities in Criminal Processing,
7 J. INST. JUST. & INT'L STUD. 261, 262 (2007) (discussing Demuth's 2003 study and
Schlesinger's 2005 study).
246. Id.
247. Donna Leinwand, Black Drivers Searched More Often, Feds Say, Disparities Appear
After Initial Stop, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2007, at 3A (discussing U.S. Department of Justice
study in detail).
248. Id.
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occurred after the initial stops.249 Police searched Black drivers around three times the
rate they searched White drivers and arrested Black drivers twice as often as White
drivers.25° Moreover, Blacks reported that police used force against them at over three
times the rate that Whites reported the use of force.25' Unfortunately, racial disparities
in treatment exist in other aspects of the criminal process. Recent studies have shown
that even when the same alleged criminal conduct is involved, Blacks are more likely
to actually be incarcerated upon conviction.
252
Across this country, there are two justice systems-one for [B]lacks and one for
[W]hites. Black (and Latino) young men are not more likely to commit crimes than
[W]hites. But they are more likely to be stopped by police, more likely to be
-arrested if stopped, more likely to be charged if arrested, more likely to be jailed if
convicted, more likely to be charged with felonies, and more likely to be tried and
imprisoned as adults.
253
This two-tiered system ofjustice is pointedly reflected in a 2004 study by the Miami
Herald finding that "White criminal offenders in Florida are nearly 50 percent more
likely than [B]lacks to get a 'withhold of adjudication,' a plea deal that blocks their
felony convictions even though they plead [guilty] to the crime. 254 The study also
concluded that "White Hispanics are 31 percent more likely than [B]lacks to get a
withhold., 255 Unconscious racism--according to a criminal defense lawyer interviewed
for the study-accounts for the disparity in the manner that prosecutors and judges
handle cases of Black defendants: "Most prosecutors and some judges see the potential
for salvation in a [W]hite defendant. With a [B]lack defendant, they see the destruction
of a civilized society.,
256
Prosecutors and other commentators, who deny that race is a factor in these
disparities, point to "pure economics. 257 White defendants often can afford to hire
attorneys "who get them the break," whereas most Black defendants cannot and must
rely on public defenders.258 But significant disparities remained even when Black and
White defendants had the same kind of legal representation-private or public.
259
The newspaper's analysis of over 800,000 felony cases from 1993 to 2002 revealed
"a system that is more likely to punish [B]lacks than [W]hites in the same
249. Id,
250. Id.
251. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMrrH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PuBLIC, 2005 8 (2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
252. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 245, at 262-63 (noting differential treatment between
Black, Latino, and White defendants whose cases have "similar legal characteristics").
253. Jesse Jackson, Racially Biased Justice Still Infects American Courtrooms, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at 29.
254. Manny Garcia & Jason Grotto, Odds Favor Whites for Plea Deals, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
26, 2004, at IA.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting H.T. Smith, a South Florida criminal defense lawyer).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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predicament., 260 Interestingly, the disparity was at its highest in drug cases, where
White defendants were "nearly twice as likely to get the break [a plea deal with no
felony conviction] as Blacks charged with the same crime." 261 These disparities persist
despite the sentencing guidelines, which Florida adopted to deal with inequalities in
sentencing.262 The study related an anecdote about two teenagers charged in separate
stabbing cases. One young man, Edward Cobbs, was Black and the other, Jared Smith,
was White. They each had "identical score sheets" for purposes of the sentencing
guidelines. Nevertheless, Smith received a withheld adjudication and two years of
house arrest. He was also permitted to work and go to school. A police sergeant
remarked that Smith received "an amazing deal." The victim's father, disappointed
with the outcome, said that "[t]his thug should be in prison."263 Cobbs, on the other
hand, did not fair so well. Like Smith, Cobbs was charged as an adult, but there was
evidence that he had a mental disorder. He was on medication for the disorder, and
even the victim's family thought that he should be placed in a mental health program.
The judge in Cobbs' case, however, thought that Cobbs' crime was "too violent to
withhold adjudication" and sentenced Cobbs to two years in prison and four years of
probation.
264
These types of biases do not exist solely in Miami. The San Jose Mercury News
reviewed around 700,000 cases in California and found statistical evidence that
compared to Blacks, Whites had better chances of: receiving "interest of justice"
dismissals, having their felony charges reduced to misdemeanors, having the number of
charges against them reduced, receiving alternative punishments, and avoiding state
prison sentences. 265 Specifically, the newspaper stated:
At virtually every stage of pretrial negotiation, [WIhites are more successful than
non-[W]hites. They do better at getting charges dropped. They're better able to get
charges reduced to lesser offenses. They draw more lenient sentences and go to
prison less often. They get more chances to wipe their records clean.
266
The bottom line was that "[W]hites as a group get significantly better deals than
Hispanics or [B]lacks who are accused of similar crimes and who have similar criminal
backgrounds. 267
A related San Jose Mercury News article-citing a federal crime victimization
survey-asserted that:
Six of every 10 times a woman is raped in California, an assault is committed or
someone gets robbed, it's a [W]hite person who's the offender .... Yet you'd
never know [W]hites commit so many of these crimes from the march of suspects
into police stations or the parade of defendants before judges. More than six of
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Schmitt, supra note 244.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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every 10 people arrested for these violent crimes are non-[W]hite, a review of
hundreds of thousands of cases shows.
268
The newspaper noted that police made unfounded arrests ofBlacks and Hispanics at
rates "sharply higher" than that of Whites.269 Some argued that this disparity "stems
from police mounting crackdowns on crime in non-[W]hite neighborhoods and using
looser standards for arresting members of minorities while they're doing it."
270
But there is also some racial bias amongst judges in the pretrial process. One
California judge, who was at the time "widely seen as one of Santa Cruz County's most
liberal, most compassionate judges," openly used the race of a Hispanic defendant as
evidence to determine whether or not the police had probable cause to arrest him.27'
The judge, who had been on the bench for fifteen years, found probable cause for an
arrest in a drug case based in part on the fact that "the suspected seller was a Hispanic
in a Hispanic part of town." 272 When questioned in an interview about this incident, the
judge said that he was "absolutely perplexed" and noted that he has "nothing but
compassion for people of all races." 273 He went on to defend his use of race in
determining whether there was probable cause: "Am I to ignore the facts before me, the
fact it was a Hispanic at that particular location?... That's a consideration. I don't
have any cases involving anybody but Hispanics at that location.274 No one seemed
to dispute that this judge tries to be fair and sensitive, but that fact highlights a large
part of the problem. Despite earnest efforts to treat criminal defendants fairly,
influential decision makers in the criminal process often "lapse into ethnic insensitivity
nonetheless," causing them to rely on race as evidence.
275
It is important to note that disparities in the treatment of Blacks in the justice system
occur at every stage of the process. As one commentator noted, "You see prosecutors
unable to understand the person's life experiences, and say, 'I'm not willing to
bargain,' unless they can identify with them." 276 Additionally, Jeffrey Butts, formerly
of the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., has noted that there is an empirical bias "at
each stage of the process" and that "[b]y the time you reach the end, you have all
minorities in the deep end of the system."
277
Because the Miami and California studies took place in locations with large
concentrations of minorities, the question arises as to whether the exposed bias is
limited to such areas. But consider the case of Minnesota, where Blacks are a relatively
268. Christopher H. Schmitt, Ethnic Disparities Start with Arrests: Many More Blacks,
Hispanics Taken into Custody, Then Freed, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1991, at 8A.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Christopher H. Schmitt, Local Judge's Remarks Labeled as Insensitive, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEwS, Dec. 9, 1991, at lA.
272. Id.
273. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
274. Id (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
275. Id.
276. Christopher H. Schmitt, Getting Minorities Fairer Plea Bargains, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 10, 1991, at IA.
277. Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, CJCJ: Race and the Juvenile Justice System,
http://www.cjcj.org/jjic/racejj.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
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small segment of the population. A recent report by Minnesota's Council on Crime and
Justice asserted that "[t]he racial disparity in Minnesota's justice system is one of the
worst in the nation., 278 Thus, it seems that disparities in the arrests and convictions of
Blacks and other minorities are not limited to areas with a large minority population.
As part of its "Racial Disparity Initiative," the Council on Crime and Justice has
conducted several studies in Minnesota and produced various reports noting their
findings and making recommendations. 279 The Council has observed that in Minnesota,
where Blacks made up approximately 3.5% of the total population in 2000, they
accounted for 37.2% of state prisoners. 280 In fact, with a "ratio of [Blacks] to [W]hites
in state prison [of] 25.09 to 1" in 1997, Minnesota had the "greatest [B]lack-to-[W]hite
disparity in imprisonment rates" of all fifty states.28'
Professor Richard Frase of the University of Minnesota has called the racial
disparities in the state "[p]erhaps the most disturbing aspect of Minnesota's prison
populations under the [sentencing] guidelines" and has noted that various studies have
revealed a "striking racial disproportionality. ' '282 He also noted that Black defendants
tend to have "higher-severity conviction offenses or more extensive criminal history
283scores"; thus, Blacks are more likely than Whites to receive a prison sentence. In
2001, nearly thirty percent of felony convictions were ofBlack defendants,284 a striking
number given Minnesota's relatively small Black population.
28 5
Studies have revealed that in Minnesota much of the racial bias takes place before
the defendants even go into the courtroom, usually beginning at the arrest stage.286 In
2001, for example, Blacks accounted for around thirty-eight percent of arrests for
"adult violent Index-Crime" and thirty percent of arrests for drug offenses.287 As with
its incarceration rate, Minnesota has the most disproportionate arrest rate for Blacks in
the United States. 288 One source of the bias, according to the Council on Crime and
278. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY WHILE ENHANCING
PUBLIC SAFETY: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14,
http://www.racialdisparity.org/files/Final%20Report-
Reducing%20Disparity/o20%20Enhancing/o2OSafety.pdf [hereinafter REDUCING RACIAL
DISPARITY].
279. Id. at 1.
280. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1, http://www.racialdisparity.org/files/African%20American%2OMales.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003,32 CRIME &JUST.
131, 199 (2005).
283. Id. at 200.
284. Id.
285. Minnesota's Black population was 4.4% in 2006. U.S. Census Bureau, Minnesota-
Fact Sheet, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html (follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink,
then select Minnesota from the drop-down menu).
286. Frase, supra note 282, at 200-01; see also Akeem Soboyede, Study Shows Racial
Disparity in MN's Justice System Exceptionally High Compared to Other States, ST. PAUL
LEGAL LEDGER, July 13, 2006 ("[T]he trip to the 'Big House' for most minorities does not start
with being caught embezzling money from an employer or stealing from a department store. It
usually originates with a traffic stop by a police officer.").
287. Frase, supra note 282, at 200.
288. Id. at 200-01.
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Justice, is that police disproportionately target people of color pursuant to a policy that
encourages them to patrol "geographic hot spots." 289 Such "hot spots" tend to be where
large concentrations of people of color can be found.2 90 "The racial disparity (i.e. the
ratio of arrest rates) for [Blacks] to White[s] was 10:1 .... Nationally, the disparity for
Blacks and Whites was 4:1; which means that the arrest rate disparity in Minnesota
[wa]s more than twice the national average. 29 1
A 2006 report on reducing racial disparity by the Council on Crime and Justice
noted that "[w]hile this [racial] disparity has many causes, racial bias is a significant
contributor., 292 The report blamed this bias on "institutional policies and practices
rather than individual racism. '293 Regardless, it found that the result was the same.
More importantly, because the result has now been revealed, failing to ameliorate the
bias "becomes an elevated and egregious form of bias., 294 The report recommends
concentrating on the institutional policies and practices that contribute to racial bias,
which are "discrete and identifiable within the justice system., 295
In a study on racial profiling analyzing traffic stop data from sixty-five jurisdictions
in Minnesota, the Council found that police stopped and searched Black, Latino, and
American Indian drivers at a significantly higher rate than White drivers, but found
contraband on those drivers of color at a lower rate than they found on White
drivers.296 Thus, there was not only a disparity in the stop rate, but in the "hit rate" as
well.
These disparities in discretionary search rates are particularly troubling given the
rates at which contraband was found as a result of these searches, i.e. the hit rates.
Overall, 24% of discretionary searches of Whites produced contraband compared
to only 11% of searched [sic] of Blacks and 9% of searches of Latinos.297
The study revealed that the "disparities are particularly large for Blacks and Latinos,"
with Blacks experiencing the largest disparity. 298 This pattern persisted across the state
of Minnesota.299 The study concluded that "[t]hese patterns suggest a strong likelihood
that racial/ethnic bias plays a role in traffic stop policies and practices in Minnesota.
The same is true for the searches that result from these stops.
300
The Council on Criminal Justice's Racial Disparity Initiative Project sparked much
discussion regarding possible solutions to the problems that it exposed. While on a
289. REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY, supra note 278, at 6 (internal quotations omitted).
290. Id. at 7.
291. Id. at 5.
292. Id. at 14.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 15.
295. Id.
296. CouNcIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT:
ALL PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS 1, 5 (2003), available at
http://www.racialdisparity.org/files/Racial%20Profiling%20Study.pdf; REDUCING RACIAL
DISPARITY, supra note 278, at 5.
297. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 296, at 1.
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 2.
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panel moderated by a Minnesota judge, University of Minnesota Law Professor
Michael H. Tonry stated, "[R]acial disparity is also a problem in England. But more
importantly, the criminal justice system there recently came out and acknowledged it is
institutionally racist. We should do the same here too as a first step in fixing the
problem."
30 1
Each of the Project's seventeen studies demonstrate how the misperception of Black
criminality can lead to convictions-particularly felonies-that can be used to impeach
a defendant later should he find himself at odds with the criminal justice system, which
is a very likely scenario. In such cases, if the defendant is like Edward Cobbs in Miami
and if a trial is held, the jury will never know that under nearly identical circumstances,
a judge gave "an amazing deal" of a withhold adjudication to another young man
whose record is now clean and cannot be used for impeachment purposes.30 2 If the
defendant received his prior conviction from a judge with biases similar to the judge
that sociologist James Austin discussed in his study, then the jury certainly will not
hear that the judge saw the defendant "differently" from the way that he saw White
defendants who were accused of committing the same crime for which the defendant
was convicted. 30 3 Nor does the jury hear that discretionary decisions-like the vast
racial profiling practice in Minnesota-that occur throughout the criminal process
often lead to harsher results for Black defendants. And not only will ajury not hear this
information under ordinary circumstances, a prosecutor usually will not consider these
issues, important as they may be, when considering whether or not to charge the
defendant in the first place. Indeed, prosecutors normally see prior records as
strengthening their cases and as part of their leverage in potential plea discussions.304
The simultaneous operation of the Black tax and the White credit in the system
produces evidence that perpetuates the Black criminal stereotype.
Problems with the perception of Black criminality arise in other aspects of the
criminal system besides pretrial processing. I consider those other aspects in the
following Parts. As with pretrial processing, each of these areas demonstrates how
racial biases can discredit the criminal system as a hearsay declarant.
2. The Black Tax and White Credit in the Courtroom
Of course, race is not just an issue in the pretrial process. Race in and of itself is
evidence in American courts. 3 51 contend that is true whether the person is a party in a
301. Soboyede, supra note 286.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 263-64; see also State v. McFadden, 772 So. 2d
1209, 1216-17 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a withheld adjudication is not a "conviction" for
impeachment purposes).
303. See infra text accompanying notes 404-05.
304. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1126 & n.37 (2008)
(noting that "[e]ven in the weakest cases, prosecutors can go forward with charges and
anticipate pleas because they know that recidivists cannot easily fight charges at trial under
existing evidence rules," such as the prior conviction impeachment rule).
305. See, e.g., Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths, and the Veil oflgnorance, 41
W..LAMETrE L. REv. 373, 375 (2005) (conceptualizing race as evidence); Aaron Goldstein,
Note, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1214-19 (2003)
(conceptualizing race, in the context of claims of self-defense, as irrelevant and prejudicial
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civil case or a defendant in a criminal case. I want to focus, however, on the criminal
context in this Article, as the prior conviction impeachment scheme is most prejudicial
to criminal defendants. Indeed, Rule 609's use of race as evidence is problematic in at
least two ways. First, as I have been discussing, many convictions are the direct result
of racial bias and lack reliability. This problem can be compounded in a court where a
prior conviction is admitted before a jury that may already have preexisting racial
biases.
A Black criminal defendant's race is likely to be an issue, whether the parties
choose to discuss the issue openly or not. The very act of a Black defendant coming
into court has some probative value; that is, race has a tendency to prove or disprove
something in the American justice system just as it does in society at large.3 6 Race is
indeed evidence and is automatically admissible, as we do not shield a person's race
from the jury. And, generally, the rules of evidence do nothing to ameliorate the
potential prejudice that might result from the evidence of a person's race. To the
contrary, Rule 609 can make the race problem much worse for a Black defendant.
One commentator has argued that we should indeed shield the race of witnesses
from jurors.307 While this is an intriguing proposal and could be useful in some
instances, it does not sufficiently take into account the conceptualization of race as
evidence inside and outside of the courtroom. Pieces of evidence, such as witness
testimony, are often "racialized" before ever entering the courtroom, as can be
demonstrated by evidence admissible under Rule 609.308
The face of crime in America, particularly violent crime, is a Black face. 309
American jurors-White and Black-come from a society that has criminalized
blackness. More often than not, when people think of the "typical" criminal defendant,
they think of a Black person.310 Given this reality, the presumption of Black criminality
would be quite prejudicial to a White defendant whose race was disguised. Without
any information to the contrary, he will very likely be presumed Black and suffer the
prejudicial effects of that presumption. In conceptualizing race as evidence, we must be
mindful of potential prejudice to all defendants, including White defendants.
Moreover, skin color in and of itself is not the only evidentiary means by which race
is identified. As Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson has noted, "[r]acial imagery can be
conveyed in pictures, stories, examples, and generalizations." 3t ' Thus, based on the
imagery that the prosecution presents, a jury may simply presume that the crime was
evidence and proposing a rule to bar "evidence suggesting that the alleged victim's race is
relevant to determining whether the defendant's apprehension of imminent or severe bodily harm
was reasonable" and "evidence suggesting that any racial group poses an increased danger to
other citizens").
306. Black's Law Dictionary defines probative as "[t]ending to prove or disprove." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (8th ed. 2004).
307. Pager, supra note 305, at 429.
308. See FED. R. EviD. 609 (allowing evidence of a witness's prior criminal conviction in
several instances in order to attack the witness's character).
309. See supra, Part II.C.
310. See R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1169, 1173
(2006).
311. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739, 1743
(1993).
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committed by a Black person. Indeed, many crimes have been mischaracterized as
"Black crimes," as I demonstrate below in discussing drug offenses.
i. Jurors' (Un)Authorized Use of Race as Evidence
Rule 609 can become a part of the racial imagery that a prosecutor uses. Ifjurors
are already predisposed to believe stereotypes about Black criminality, the introduction
of Rule 609 evidence against a Black defendant will likely confirm those stereotypes-
even though the prior conviction itself might have been the result of Black
mischaracterization. Studies have shown that jurors consider race in a manner that is
prejudicial to Black criminal defendants.3t 2 As an initial matter, there is already
significant evidence against a criminal defendant embodied in the accusation of
criminal behavior itself.3 3 In every aspect of the trial, the prosecutor is labeling the
defendant as a criminal. 314 The weight of the accusation of criminality can frustrate the
presumption of innocence that we hold so dear in our criminal justice system.3 5 When
the defendant is Black, race adds even more weight to the force of the accusation.
316
These observations about how race shapes society's views of criminality are quite
significant in criminal cases because they hold true in the courtroom as well. "Jurors
come from the same society that produces the shop owners, police, the readers of Time
[which darkened the image of O.J. Simpson], and the constituents mentioned above [in
Part I]. The opening statement of the prosecutor is even more likely to stick when the
face they see at counsel table is a dark one.,
3 17
Empirical evidence based on mock jury trials has demonstrated that in cases where
evidence is not overwhelmingly in favor of one party or the other, race was especially
significant in jurors' decision-making processes. 318 Moreover, studies have shown that
in a criminal case where there is not much evidence against a defendant, the jury is
more likely to convict the defendant if the victim is the same race as the jurors.319 This
is particularly significant because juries tend to be mostly White.320 "[W]hen the
evidence is sparse, jurors are more likely to attribute guilt to defendants of a different
race.... [I]n marginal evidence conditions [B]lack defendants will tend to be acquitted
less often than [W]hite defendants and [B]lack defendants with [W]hite victims will
tend to be acquitted least often. 3 21 Also, when the mock jurors were given
incomprehensible sentencing guidelines, they tended to rely on race in their decision-
312. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How MuchDo We Really KnowAbout
Race and Juries: A Review of Social Science Theory andResearch, 78 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 997,
1016 (2003) (discussing "two studies [that] provide support for the hypothesis that White juror
bias is actually more likely to occur in trials without salient racial issues, where norms regarding
race are weak-a conclusion that is consistent with theories of modern racism").
313. See Ross, supra note 64, at 262.
314. Id. at 229.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 261.
317. Id. at263.
318. Lynch, supra note 69, at 189.
319. Johnson, supra note 241, at 951.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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making processes.322 This empirical evidence suggests, then, that White jurors would
rely on racial stereotypes in weighing Rule 609 evidence, especially given the
incomprehensible instructions that tend to accompany such evidence.
Professor Cynthia Lee discusses the "Black-as-criminal stereotype" and how it
relates to a claim of self-defense. 323 She notes that "[t]he Black-as-criminal stereotype
is so deeply entrenched in American culture that false claims of Black criminality are
made and, in many cases, readily believed. 324 She acknowledges that "[o]ne of the
stereotypes most often applied to [Black] males is that they are more dangerous, more
prone to violence, and more likely to be criminals or gang members than other
members of society., 325 She observes that Black women are also stereotyped as
"untrustworthy, criminal, or dangerous."326 Drawing on social science studies, she
concluded that such stereotyping can lead people to view ambiguous actions as violent
when the actor was a Black person, but nonviolent when the actor was a White
person.3 27 Again Rule 609 evidence would reinforce these stereotypes and compound
the already existing problem.
Studies have shown "that White Americans are willing to be particularly punitive
when presented with stereotypical images of [Black] violent felons as the object of
punishment policies," in comparison to their view of how a White felon in the same
position should be treated. 328 This tendency to treat Black defendants more harshly has
been discussed extensively in the capital-sentencing context, where the stakes are
literally matters of life and death.329 Interviews ofjurors from capital cases, as part of
the comprehensive Capital Jury Project, demonstrated that White jurors in capital cases
involving a Black defendant and a White victim relied on racial stereotypes in deciding
that death was the appropriate sentence.330 Similarly, Fleury-Steiner's 2004 study
"powerfully revealed how racialized cultural stereotypes, particularly about the
propensity to do violence, shape White jurors' narratives about minority defendants,
their culpability, and ultimately their death-worthiness.
' 331
A recent study in the Psychological Science Journal found that: "People associate
Black physical traits with criminality in particular. The more stereotypically Black a
person's physical traits appear to be, the more criminal that person is perceived to
be. 3 32 Using a database of over 600 "death-eligible" cases, the study demonstrated that
in cases in which the death penalty was a possible sentence and where the victim was
White, the Black defendants' physical features "function[ed] as a significant
322. Lynch, supra note 69, at 189.
323. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MiNN. L. REV. 367, 408-21 (1996).
324. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 403.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 404-05.
328. Lynch, supra note 69, at 188.
329. See id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Looking Deathworthy, Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383, 383 (2006).
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determinant of deathworthiness. ' '333 The study concluded that "defendants whose
appearance was perceived as more stereotypically Black were more likely to receive a
death sentence than defendants whose appearance was perceived as less stereotypically
Black., 334 Thus, in the most serious of cases-those with the ultimate penalty of
death-researchers have confirmed that blackness equals such evil and depravity that it
warrants the death sentence in the minds ofjurors.
Courts typically inform jurors that they are not to let any type of bias or prejudice,
which would include racial bias, weigh into their decisions. However, there is currently
no way to be sure that jurors do not let race bias, particularly unconscious race bias,
play into their decisions. The law presumes that jurors follow courts' instructions
without ever questioning whether this is actually the case.
ii. Prosecutors' Misuse of Race as Evidence in Arguments to Jury
Prosecutors recognize the powerful effect that blackness can have on a jury's
assessment of character. Unfortunately, prosecutors sometimes use "racial code words"
to play on stereotypes and create "images of [B]lack-ill characters. 3 35 For example, in
Smith v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a conviction in a case despite the
fact that the prosecutor argued in closing that a Black defense witness was "shucking
and jiving on the stand," a phrase that the court found was "clearly of [B]lack origin"
and reminded jurors of the "untrustworthy appearance of this witness. 3 36 That same
prosecutor also argued that the defendant "had to play Superfly," referencing an
idealized Black fictional character, who happens to be a Harlem pimp. 337 Prosecutors
have also sent racial cues by referring to Black defendants as "they" or "them," as an
indication that Blacks are generally outliers in the moral, civilized, and law-abiding
society to which the jurors themselves belong.331 In State v. Henderson,339 the
prosecution made the following argument to the jury regarding the defendant's
witnesses, all of whom were Black:
This is a case of gang violence. This isn't a case where two parties from the
suburbs are having a dispute. One party from Edina and another party from North
Oaks are having a minor dispute. This is a case about gang violence. Gangs.
[T]he people that are involved in this world are not people from your world.
Their experiences, their lifestyles are totally foreign to all of you. These are not
your world. These are the Defendant's people. They are his friends.
340
333. Id. at 383-84.
334. Id. at 384.
335. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRiA. L. 121, 133 (2006).
336. 516 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Ind. 1987).
337. Id.
338. See Ryan P. Alford, Appellate Review ofRacist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of
Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 334-35 (2006).
339. 620 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 2001).
340. Id. at 702 (alteration in original).
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Rule 609 sanctions this type of racial code, given the deep-rooted Black-as-criminal
stereotype. It allows a prosecutor to place the defendant in the "other" category-in
much the same way that proponents of the prior conviction impeachment rule intended.
"One of the best means for a prosecutor to establish her ethos and to appeal to the
jurors' pathos in the context of the criminal trial is to define the defendant as a member
of the 'other.' 341 In doing so, the prosecutor essentially "draw[s] a line around the
defendant, locating both herself and her audience on the same opposite of that line-
thereby defining the attorney as a trustworthy member of the jurors' community. 342
Not surprisingly, prosecutors have employed this oratorical method "from the time of
Cicero until the present." 343 Jurors will naturally have a negative view of the defendant.
Though some appellate courts have reversed trial court judgments resulting from
attorneys' arguments appealing to racial bias, in other cases they have simply found
such arguments permissible, as the court in Smith did,344 or "harmless error," as the
court in Henderson did.345 Even more troubling is the very real likelihood that appeals
to racial bias go completely unnoticed or are simply not subject to objection.
3. A Closer Look at Drug Offenses
It has been argued that "the real racial disparity in treatment exists with respect to
nonviolent, victinless crimes, where the discretion of the actors within the criminal
justice system is most influential.,, 346 It is in this area that the decision makers in the
criminal justice system have almost unfettered discretion and can "choose which of the
many drug users or distributors to arrest." 347 Even those who argue that the
overrepresentation of Blacks in prison is due to the higher involvement of Blacks in
serious crimes make an exception to their argument for drug offenses. Such an
acknowledgment, however, should not be relegated to footnote status. "In the United
States and many other nations, it is no longer possible to talk honestly and frankly
341. Alford, supra note 338, at 334-35 (emphasis in original).
342. Id. at 335.
343. Id.
344. Smith v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1055, 1063-65 (Ind. 1987).
345. 620 N.W.2d at 703 (expressing "concern" over the arguments, but finding that it was
not so inexcusably serious and prejudicial that Henderson's right to a fair trial was denied); see
also People v. Bahoda, 531 N.W.2d 659, 662-65 (Mich. 1995) (finding that the prosecution
made "several references" to defendant's "Arabic ethnicity" at a trial that took place during the
Persian Gulf War, but determining such references "to be innocuous, unintended and not of a
degree that prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial").
346. Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern Day Literacy Test? Felon Disenfranchisement
and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 629 (2004).
347. Id.; see also R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War,
56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 578 (noting that "drug law enforcement is highly discretionary," that
"rates of arrest and conviction reflect investigation and enforcement decisions as much as
underlying rates of criminality," and that "[t]he self-fulfilling prophecy argument reminds us
that the outcomes often offered as the justification for racial profiling may, in fact, be the
consequence of racial profiling, which can create the appearance of racial differences in
criminality even when there are none").
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
about racism without talking about the 'war on drugs.'" 348 And drug offenses have been
found to have "a bearing on credibility" for Rule 609 purposes, necessitating the need
for a discussion of race and the "war on drugs" as part of the Rule 609 problem.
349
Over the last twenty years, the so-called "war on drugs" has become the "most
significant factor contributing to the disproportionate incarceration of [Blacks] in
prisons and jails. ... The escalation of drug prosecutions has coincided with a large-
scale law enforcement emphasis on drug policing in communities of color."350 National
statistics show that 33.9% of drug arrests in 2005 were of Blacks even though they
represent only fourteen percent of drug users.351' Fifty-three percent of persons
sentenced to prison for drug offenses are Black.352
These disparities have been particularly harsh on Black men, but between 1986 and
2001 the rate of incarceration for Black women increased by a staggering 800%.
313
This sharp increase in the incarceration of Black women is due in large part to
convictions for drug offenses.3
It is well documented that the history of drug illegalization in the United States is
rooted in racism. 355 In the 1800s, "opiates and cocaine were freely available and used
both medicinally and recreationally by people throughout the U.S. '356 The "typical"
drug addict was "a middle aged, rural, middle- or upper-class White woman." 357 Drug
addiction was common and considered a "health problem" that doctors and
pharmacists were well suited to treat.35s This sentiment changed, however, when the
perception of the average drug user changed. San Francisco passed the first "anti-drug"
law in 1875 .359 The city outlawed the smoking of opium because there was a fear that
"Chinese men were using it to lure [W]hite women into their opium dens and to their
ruin. ' 36 Shortly thereafter, the federal government passed a law that "made it illegal
for anyone of Chinese origin to traffic in opium.
36
'
Similarly, one article stated that most "attacks upon [W]hite women of the South are
the direct result of the cocaine-crazed Negro brain., 362 Police in the South even started
using .38 caliber revolvers because they were concerned that "cocaine made Blacks
348. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE NETWORK, THE RACIAL HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG PROHIBITION
(2001), http://www.drugpolicy.org/about/position/race_paperhistory.cfin.
349. United States v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 44 (st Cir. 2006).
350. Mauer, supra note 174, at 25-26.
351. Id. at 26.
352. Id.
353. Charles J. Ogletree, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., Discriminatory Impact of
Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the United States, Testimony Before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 3, 2006), in 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 273, 276 (2006).
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., Mauer, supra note 161, at 16.
356. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE NETWORK, supra note 348.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Robert N. Taylor, Special Report: The Racist History of the War on Drugs, WASH.
INFORMER, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://www.washingtoninformer.com/ARWaronDrugs2005Dec22.html.
360. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
361. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
362. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE NETwoRK, supra note 348.
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impervious to .32 caliber bullets." 363 It has been said that the purpose of stories like
this one was to convince southern congressional members to vote for the Harrison
Narcotics Act, which would give the federal government tremendous power to regulate
drugs. 364 "This lie was also necessary, since, even though drugs were widely used in
America, very little crime was associated with the users."
365
The earliest laws prohibiting the use of marijuana were local ordinances in El Paso,
Texas. "At the time, the Texas government wanted legal avenues to control the
immigrant... population.",366 During the 1920s, marijuana was seen as a "[B]lack
drug., 367 "Not until the 1960s, when college educated [W]hite liberals started openly
using marijuana and questioning marijuana policy, did the marijuana laws in the United
States become more lenient."
368
More recently, federal law with respect to crack cocaine and powder cocaine has
been similarly racialized.369 Legal scholars and other commentators have long
criticized the disparities between crack and powder cocaine in drug sentencing.370 As
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress implemented a drug policy that
created rather extreme disparities in the treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine
offenses; thus, there are disparities for "two forms of the same drug."
371
Under 21 U.S.C. § 844, a person who is convicted for the first time of possessing
any amount of powder cocaine can be sentenced to no more than one year in prison.372
On the other hand, that same statute provides that a person convicted for the first time
"for the possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base shall be
imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years. '373 21 U.S.C. § 841 and
the corresponding provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines produce a
100:1 sentencing disparity for the distribution of crack cocaine and powder cocaine.374
From a race standpoint, the problem with this distinction is that around eighty-five
percent of those convicted and sentenced for crack offenses are Black.375
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its recent decision Kimbrough v. United
States, "a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as
one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine." 376 Thus, a "major supplier of powder
cocaine may receive a shorter sentence than a low-level dealer who buys powder from
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Varun Soni, Freedom from Subordination: Race, Religion, and the Struggle for
Sacrament, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 33, 60 (2005).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 61.
370. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of
Punishment, 56 STAN'. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2004) (noting that "[m]uch attention has been given
to the racial implications of the disparity between powder cocaine and crack cocaine").
371. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 565-66 (2007).
372. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); see also Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of
Equality, 84 TEx. L. REV. 2097, 2114 (2006) (discussing sentencing for federal drug offenses).
373. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006).
374. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567.
375. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 568.
376. Id. at 564.
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the supplier but then converts it to crack., 377 In Kimbrough, the Court held that district
courts are not required to enforce the "crack/powder" disparity in sentences for crack
and cocaine offenses. Citing United States v. Booker, the Court found that the United
States Sentencing Guidelines are "advisory only" and that a district court may consider
the crack/powder disparity among other factors in determining the appropriateness of a
sentence.378
The United States Sentencing Commission initially incorporated the crack/powder
disparity in its Guidelines setting the base offense levels for drug trafficking, but it has
since changed its view on whether the sentencing disparity is warranted.379 The
Commission found that the disparity does not further Congress's stated goals in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act and that recent data no longer supports the previous perceptions
about the harmfulness of crack in relation to powder cocaine.3 8 0 On several occasions,
the Commission has unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Congress to reduce the
crack/powder disparity.
38 1
Most recently, in November 2007, the Commission issued a report asking Congress
to amend the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.382 Additionally, the Commission made a "modest"
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, which would make sentences for crack
offenses two to five times longer than they would be for the same amount of cocaine.
383
Noting that this amendment was only a "partial remedy," the Commission stated that
Congress would have to implement more "comprehensive" solutions to the problem
through legislative action.3 84 Members of Congress have introduced various bills that
would reduce some of the disparity. Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee in particular
has recently introduced a bill that would eliminate altogether the crack/powder
disparity, though she has acknowledged the legislation "faces a strong challenge."
385
Kimbrough and the recent actions of the United States Sentencing Commission are
positive steps to ameliorating the crack/powder disparity. However, these steps are far
from concrete solutions. Kimbrough gives judges discretion; but judges remain free to
continue this very harsh disparity, which the Commission admits is unwarranted. The
problem with judicial discretion is that it can be used in a way that assesses the Black
tax and grants the White credit (as I discussed above with the Miami cases, for
example). Additionally, the Commission's recent amendment is quite modest. So, the
crack/powder disparity may persist for some time to come.
Even more troubling are the other drug laws, such as drug free school zone laws,
that many states and the federal government have adopted. New Jersey even has special
drug free public housing zone laws.38 6 Such laws, which increase punishment for drug
377. Id. at 566.
378. Id. at 564.
379. See id. at 568.
380. Id.
381. Id. at569.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Michelle Mittelstadt, Jackson Lee Says Strict Sentencing Costs Society: Lawmaker
Wants to Eliminate Bias in Crack Cases andBoost Treatment, HOUSTON CHRoN., Feb. 3,2008,
at A10.
386. Mauer, supra note 174, at 29-30.
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offenses in specified zones, lead to disparate treatment of Blacks in the criminal
system.387 Because Blacks and other minorities tend to live in urban areas that are
much closer to schools or public housing, they are more likely to be the target of
harsher treatment in the criminal system because of such laws. 388 In New Jersey, for
example, ninety-six percent of the people serving time for "drug free zone offenses"
are Black or Hispanic.
389
The most disturbing aspect of the drug offense disparities is that they are only a
symptom of the much larger problem I have presented in this Article-which is that the
criminal law has, both historically and currently, been largely constructed on the
foundation of race. The criminal justice system's reliance on race in defining what
constitutes criminal behavior has been to the great disadvantage of minorities,
particularly Blacks. Eliminating the crack/powder disparity will not cure the disease of
mischaracterizing Blacks as criminals that has infected the criminal justice system. But
it is a positive step, as is addressing the unfair impact of drug laws on the application
and operation of Rule 609. The following Part, which deals specifically with the
mischaracterization of Black children as criminals, demonstrates how deeply this
mischaracterization has penetrated into the American psyche and how it threatens the
viability of the next Black generation.
4. The Pipeline to Prison: A Closer Look at the Treatment of Black Children in
Schools and the Juvenile Justice System
As mentioned earlier in this Article, juvenile adjudications are generally not
admissible under Rule 609. Though there are very limited exceptions to this rule,
juvenile convictions are never admissible against a criminal defendant. It is, however,
ofparamount importance to discuss racial bias in the juvenile system because juvenile
justice problems with Black youth often turn into more serious issues (such as felony
convictions and long prison sentences). Once in the system, Black youth are more
likely to remain in the system. Moreover, they are more likely to be waived into adult
court where their felony convictions can be used as Rule 609 evidence. On the other
hand, White youth often get the benefit of staying in the juvenile system (or not having
to deal with the system at all) and/or get the benefit of rehabilitation programs. Thus,
their juvenile convictions will never be used against them under Rule 609 in any future
interaction with the criminal system because juvenile offenses are not admissible for
impeachment.
Unfortunately, the perception of Black criminality negatively shapes how society
views Black children. A friend, a Black woman, recently forwarded a copy of an e-mail
she sent to the headmaster of her son's exclusive private school in the heart of a major
U.S. city. The e-mail was regarding the casting decisions made for the school's
upcoming musical production of The Bremen Town Musicians. My friend was deeply
disturbed upon learning that her son, a second-grader and one of very few Black
children in the school, had been cast in the musical as the robber.390 Sure, given the
production that the school chose, someone had to play the robber. The question is why
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. A copy of the e-mail is on file with author.
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the Black child? Moreover, as a school that purported to be committed to promoting
diversity and cultural sensitivity, there was good reason to avoid casting the Black
child as the robber, as doing so would most certainly reinforce well known negative
stereotypes of Blacks as criminals.
My friend's story raises the question about how teachers, principals, and other
adults in the school system, public and private, perceive Black children. As I noted in
Part I of this Article-jurors, teachers, principals, and other adults in the school system
come from the same society in which Black criminality has been deeply engrained in
the American psyche. The Chicago Tribune recently reported that Black students are
far more likely than White students to be suspended or expelled from school.
Fifty years after federal troops escorted nine [B] lack students through the doors of
an all-[W]hite high school in Little Rock, Ark., in a landmark school integration
struggle, America's public schools remain as unequal as they have ever been when
measured in terms of disciplinary sanctions such as suspensions and expulsions,
according to little-noticed data collected by the U.S. Department of Education for
the 2004-2005 school year.
391
Though research has found that Black children are no more likely than children of any
other race or ethnic group to have behavioral problems, Black children are disciplined
at a much higher rate than any other group.392 According to one expert in educational
psychology, "[t]here simply isn't any support for the notion that, given the same set of
circumstances, [Black] kids act out to a greater degree than other kids." 393 Moreover,
he stated that "the data indicate that [Black] students are punished more severely for
the same offense, so clearly something else is going on. We can call it structural
inequity or we can call it institutional racism.
'
1
394
This issue of disparate treatment in schools is not just about a student's negative
school discipline record. Disparities in the discipline of school children based on race
are significant because studies show that a record of school suspensions or expulsions
"is a strong predictor of future trouble with the law., 395 Indeed, such a record is a part
of what some civil rights leaders have called the "school-to-prison pipeline."
396
Schools are increasingly calling law enforcement officials to deal with disciplinary
issues. And the disproportionate treatment of Black youth continues once they are in
the juvenile justice system. In California, for example, "[Black] youth with felony
arrests are 4.4 times more likely than [W]hite youth with felony arrests to be sentenced
to the California Youth Authority. '397 Data compiled in 2000 from the twelve most
populated counties in California revealed that Black youth made up just nine percent of
391. Howard Witt, School Discipline Harder on Blacks: Analysis of Federal Data Shows
Racial Inequality in Suspensions and Expulsions Nationwide; Locally, the Gap Is Widest in
Lake and DuPage, Cm. TRiB., Sept. 25, 2007, at Cl.
392. Id.
393. Id. (quoting Russell Skiba, a professor of educational psychology at Indiana University
whose research focuses on race and discipline issues in public schools).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, supra note 277.
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the population but forty-three percent of arrests and thirty-five percent of ultimate
commitments to detention.398 On the other hand, White youth made up thirty-five
percent of the youth population but only twenty-five percent of the total youth arrests
and fifteen percent of commitments to detention.
399
Nationwide studies also show that while "[Blacks] represent 15% of the population,
[they represent] 26% ofjuvenile arrests, 44% of youth who are detained, 46% of the
youth who are judicially waived to [adult] criminal court, and 58% of the youth
admitted to state prisons." 4°0 Indeed, "[Black] children [are] transferred to adult courts
in greatly higher numbers than [W]hite children.' 4°O One study of eighteen jurisdictions
found that eighty-two percent of transfers to the adult system were of minority youth
and seventy percent of the transferred youth in particular were Black.402 "In one
extreme example of a county in Alabama, [Black] youth accounted for [three] out of
[ten] felony arrests while representing [eighty] percent of felony cases transferred to
adult court .... ,43
In one study, sociologist James Austin reported that a judge openly acknowledged
that he sees Black and White youth differently even when they are charged with
similar crimes.404 According to Austin, Black youth, particularly males, "are seen as
less controllable, with limited family support, if returned to the community."4 5 On a
macro level, the juvenile system as a whole seems to view Black youth differently.
Given the raw data, it is reasonable to think that this judge's sentiment, though it may
not be openly expressed often, is shared by a number ofjudges and other influential
actors in the criminal process. Consider, for example, the juvenile specialty courts that
are focused on rehabilitation for drug offenders. "[I]n early reporting ofjuvenile drug
court numbers, [W]hite children constituted the largest racial group receiving this sort
of rehabilitative treatment."406 Thus, in the juvenile justice system, rehabilitation-that
is, "the judgment that a child can be saved"--is not "available on a truly race neutral
basis.
,40 7
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. See Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IowA L. REv. 951,
989 (2006); see also Position Statement, Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Adjudication of Youths as
Adults in the Criminal Justice System (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/PositionSt
atements/200507.aspx (noting that Black youth are far more likely to receive "waivers" and
"transfers" to the adult criminal system).
402. Position Statement, supra note 401.
403. Id.
404. John Cheves, Detention of Black Teens Up for Scrutiny, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Sept. 7, 1999, at Al.
405. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
406. Filler & Smith, supra note 401, at 989.
407. Id. at 989-90.
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D. Misperceptions Based on "Reasonable Racism "?
Some may argue that any perceptions, or misperceptions, of criminality based on
race in the criminal justice system (and in society in general for that matter), are
reasonable. Professor Armour uses the term "Negrophobia" to describe the
"posttraumatic stress disorder about Blacks that courts have actually permitted to play
a role in formal legal proceedings. '4 8 Relying on empirical data, he posits that
"unconscious racial discrimination influences the social judgments of all Americans
and lies at the heart of 'Negrophobia."'4 9 He also introduces the terms the
"Reasonable Racist," the "Intelligent Bayesian," and the "Involuntary Negrophobe," all
of which describe persons who use the concept of reasonableness, albeit in different
ways, to conclude that Blacks are more likely to commit crimes.
410
The Reasonable Racist is someone who believes that it is reasonable to believe that
Blacks are more likely to commit crimes because "most similarly situated Americans
would have done so as well" even though this belief is rooted in racism. 411 The
Intelligent Bayesian also relies on reasonableness, but her reliance is based on statistics
demonstrating that Blacks disproportionately commit crimes. 4 2Thus, her argument is
that it is "logical" to treat Blacks "differently. '" 41 3 Professor Armour demonstrates how
the law, with its fondness for the standard of reasonableness, embodies the very
concepts of reasonableness that both the Reasonable Racist and the Intelligent
Bayesian employ.
414
Professor Armour's third category of reasonable racism describes what he calls the
"Involuntary Negrophobe."4 15 The Involuntary Negrophobe is someone who has had a
negative and traumatic encounter with a Black person and has "develop[ed] a
pathological phobia towards all Blacks."416 This person engages in a different type of
reasonableness--one based on a subjective test.417 If a "typical" individual who had the
same experience would develop the same phobia, then the Involuntary Negrophobe's
reaction to all Blacks is considered reasonable.4 18 While noting that this variation of
reasonableness in the context of race is "open-ended and dangerous," Professor
Armour also informs us that "the legal system has already accepted its underlying
408. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 17.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 71-80.
411. Id. at 19; see also Loren Page Ambinder, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial
Discrimination in Taxicab Service and the Efficacy of Litigation Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 342, 368 (1996) (discussing discrimination against Blacks by taxicab
drivers and noting that "[b]oth cabdrivers and their many apologists advance the argument that
taxicab service discrimination is the rational result of a realistic assessment of the risks involved
in picking up Black passengers-an assessment that is 'accurately' informed by evidence such
as crime statistics and generalized experience with Black individuals").
412. ARMOUR, supra note 48, at 37.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 21.
415. Id. at61.
416. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
417. Id. at62.
418. Id. at63.
[Vol. 84:521
2009] A RACE CRITIQUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT 579
doctrinal and psychological propositions."'419 He gives the example of a Florida
workers' compensation case in which the judge accepted a "Negrophobic" plaintiff's
claim that she could not work around Black people, especially "big, Black males," after
a Black male mugged her while she was working for her employer.42 0 The judge
awarded workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff based on her "work-related
phobia."
, 42 1
If a hearsay declarant who helped secure a Rule 609 conviction in the criminal
justice process is a Reasonable Racist, an Intelligent Bayesian, or an Involuntary
Negrophobe, then that person is biased regardless of how reasonable the declarant, or
the courts for that matter, may consider the bias to be. Negrophobia has shaped the
declarant's perception of Blacks. Indeed, the studies discussed in Part III of this Article
indicate that Negrophobia has played a large part in the biases against Blacks in the
criminal process and the resulting construction of Black criminality. Those biases
substantially diminish the reliability of criminal convictions. Of course, reasonableness
has its place in the law; but reliability, not reasonableness, is the overarching concern
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. While Negrophobia may produce reasonable racism,
it does not produce reliable racism. As has been shown time after time,
institutionalized racism is inherently unreliable.
Rule 609 requires reliability. And, in general, evidence law requires reliability. In
the context of expert witness testimony, for example, the Supreme Court has rejected
the standard of admissibility that focused merely on "general acceptance" in the
scientific community in favor of a standard that makes reliability the primary
guideline. 2 With respect to scientific testimony, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court noted that "the requirement that an expert's testimony
pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."4
23
The focus on reliability is, according to the Court, consistent with the "common law
insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information. '424 The Court explained that
by referencing evidentiary reliability, it was really talking about "trustworthiness.
'425
E. Considering Community Views on Reliability
It is important to note that reliability can very well be in the eyes of the beholder.
One's view on the reliability of the criminal justice system may differ based on one's
experiences with the system. Interestingly, though, according to a survey completed in
1999 by the National Center for State Courts, there is "an overwhelming belief that
equal justice under the law is more equal to some than to others. And this is
important-it's not just specific groups who see inequality. It's the public at large.
'4-2 6
419. Id. at 62.
420. Id. at 63.
421. Id. at 63-64; see generally William Booth, Phobia About Blacks Brings Worker's
Compensation Award; Florida Woman Filed Claim After Parking-Lot Mugging, WASH. Post,
Aug. 13, 1992, at A3.
422. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
423. Id. at 590.
424. Id. at 592.
425. Id. at 591 n.9.
426. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS., How THE PUBLIC VIEws THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
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The study showed that "White and Hispanic-Americans tend to agree that [Blacks] are
treated worse than other groups by the legal system."427 The pervasiveness of this view
is striking given that, as discussed in Part I of this Article, statistics also show that the
public associates blackness with criminality. Thus, even though society has constructed
Black criminality, it also sees that Blacks are treated unfairly in the justice system.
Moreover, while "only [twenty-three] percent of [Blacks] believe the court system
treats them the same as it does other people.... Almost [seventy percent] of [Blacks]
respondents think that [Blacks], as a group, get 'Somewhat Worse' or 'Far Worse'
treatment from the courts" than other people.428 These numbers are not surprising,
particularly in the criminal context. Among the Black community, there is a deep
mistrust of the criminal justice system and a serious doubt as to its likelihood of
delivering reliable convictions. The mistrust is even prevalent amongst Blacks with no
criminal record. The "mistrust is deeply, historically entrenched .... The utter lack of
faith [of Blacks] in the criminal justice system is corrosive .... 429
The mistrust in the Black community cuts across generations. For example, a 2003
study of 911 young people from New York City found that that Black youth are highly
likely to harbor feelings of mistrust in the criminal system.430 These youth, "had
relatively little criminal justice experience" in terms of arrests and convictions, though
the police had stopped over half of them.431 Indeed, both Black and Hispanic youth felt
the least safe of any other group in the city and "were significantly more likely than
other groups to worry about being arrested and harassed by police. ' 432 "Stories of
police harassment came largely from Black and Hispanic youth.' 433 A White female
even reported being harassed by police when she was with a Black youth because the
police assumed they were drug dealers.434 One Black female said, "[y]ou get used to
this, the pat downs, spread eagles. '4
35
The public perception that the law does not treat Blacks equally is troubling,
particularly given the studies that demonstrate that this perception is reality. At a
national state judiciary conference, an overwhelming majority ofparticipants "believed
the greatest challenge facing the state courts is strengthening the relationship with the
public. ' '436 This point recognizes that the public's view of the justice system is quite
NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (1999), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.pdf.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 3, 8.
429. Editorial, When Race Is at Issue... Get Special Prosecutor in Cop Shooting, NEWSDAY
(Long Island, N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2007, at A30.
430. See Michelle Fine, Nick Freudenberg, Yasser Payne, Tiffany Perkins, Kersha Smith &
Katya Wanzer, "Anything Can Happen with Police Around": Urban Youth Evaluate Strategies
of Surveillance in Public Places, 59 J. Soc. IssuEs 141 (2003).
431. Deanna L. Wilkinson, Local Social Ties and Willingness to Intervene: Textured Views
Among Violent Urban Youth of Neighborhood Social Control Dynamics and Situations, 24
JUST. Q. 185, 189 (2007) (analyzing study highlighted in article, "Anything Can Happen with
Police Around").
432. Id.
433. Fine et al., supra note 430, at 153.
434. Id.
435. Id
436. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 426, at 6.
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relevant. Indeed, it is an "integral" aspect of the system itself.437 When laws and
decision makers in the criminal process are biased against Blacks, they have infused
racial bias, and hence unreliability, into the criminal justice system.438
Moreover, within the criminal justice system, "racial profiling is ineffective as a
law-enforcement tool.' '4 39 Blacks and other minorities' distrust of the system "hinders
law enforcement because minorities are less likely to report crime or to participate in
prosecutions." 0 Many minorities simply refuse to serve jury duty, as has been
observed when "potential jurors often refuse to serve in crack cases, knowing that the
penalties hurt [Blacks] more."'441 Professor Paul Butler has urged those Blacks who
will participate as jurors to consider engaging in jury nullification and acquitting Black
defendants even though they may be guilty because of the racial bias in the system.
442
In short, it is simply impossible for the criminal system to be effective without
cooperation from minority communities." 3
The rebuilding of the trust level is important to the integrity of the justice system.
Most importantly, it is important to the [Black] community whose own peace and
safety is best served by a generally accepted respect for the rule-of-law, not by a
disproportionate presence of the police and the criminal justice system. 44
To many people, of all races, the system currently lacks integrity, and hence reliability.
This fact cannot be ignored when analyzing the propriety and fairness of prior
conviction impeachment.
F. Lessons from the Innocence Movement
The innocence movement, with the advent of DNA testing, has exposed the very
real truth that many innocent persons, mostly minorities, have been wrongly
convicted." 5 Professor Brandon Garrett recently published findings of an empirical
study in which he analyzed the evidence from the original trials of inmates who were
exonerated through DNA testing. As of May 2007, 200 persons had been exonerated
through such testing.4 6 Professor Garrett's study analyzed evidence from each ofthose
437. See id. at 7.
438. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race, The Power and Privilege ofDiscretion, 67
FORDUAM L. REV. 13, 38 (1998).
439. Johnson, supra note 21, at 310.
440. Id.
441. Richard B. Schmitt, Panel May Cut Thousands of Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2007, at Al.
442. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (arguing that the current treatment of Blacks in the
criminal system makes it the "moral responsibility of [B]lackjurors to emancipate some guilty
[B]lack outlaws").
443. Johnson, supra note 21, at 310.
444. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 280, at 10 (emphasis added).
445. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79 (2008)
(observing that there is a "disproportionate" number of minorities "among those exonerated by
postconviction [sic] DNA testing").
446. Id. at 64.
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cases. 447 The demographics of the "innocence group" were "troubling.'A4s Sixty-two
percent of those exonerated were Black.449 In all, seventy-one percent were minorities,
which is much more "than is typical even among average populations of rape and
murder convicts."4 50 Professor Garrett's analysis revealed that unreliable evidence,
particularly cross-racial identifications, played a large role in convicting these innocent
persons.
451
The innocence movement raises some disturbing issues regarding the overall
reliability of the entire system. Because the availability of and access to DNA testing is
limited, there must be deep concerns that there are many more innocent persons
serving time in prison, even on death row, who may never be able to prove their
innocence. Moreover, DNA evidence is only relevant in certain cases, typically rape
and murder. Thus, exoneration via DNA testing offers only a mere glimpse into the
failings of our criminal justice system, particularly as it pertains to Blacks. We must
begin to address the innocence movement seriously and its implication regarding the
reliability of Rule 609 evidence and the desirability of continuing this practice.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: REMEDYING THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEM
In this Part, I analyze the due process problems that the use of unreliable prior
convictions create. I then propose that Congress and state legislatures confront the
reality of racial bias in the criminal process and eliminate the use of prior convictions
to impeach criminal defendants, in light of the current unreliability of the criminal
justice system across the country. Until the use of prior convictions to impeach
criminal defendants is abolished, however, courts should intervene and allow
defendants to challenge the reliability of their prior convictions, as they have the right
to "impeach" the credibility of hearsay declarants.
A. What's Due Process Got to Do with It?
The reliability problems with prior convictions discussed above raise serious due
process concerns for criminal defendants with prior records. Ordinarily, a judgment of
conviction from another U.S. court is admissible, provided that the other limitations of
Rule 609, discussed above, are met. When a prosecutor seeks to use a defendant's prior
conviction against him or her at trial for impeachment purposes, the defendant has
essentially little or no opportunity to challenge the validity of the prior conviction. The
Supreme Court in Loper v. Beto held, however, that convictions that were rendered in
violation of the right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainright452 are not reliable and
cannot be used as a basis for impeachment under Rule 609. The use of such
447. Id.
448. See id. at 66.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. See id. at 79-80.
452. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
453. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972) ("The absence of counsel impairs the
reliability of such convictions just as much when used to impeach as when used as direct proof
of guilt." (quoting Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1970))).
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convictions would violate due process, according to the Court.454 Loper's reach seems
to be quite limited. It applies to convictions obtained in cases where the right to
counsel was denied altogether and later determined to be void.455 There have only been
"modest" extensions of the doctrine beyond this bright line application, for example, if
the defendant was denied access to counsel before his cross-examination.456
But the Court's concern in Loper with reliability should extend to all prior
convictions sought to be used against defendants under Rule 609. Though many
judges are likely hesitant to extend Loper beyond its narrow scope, "the rationale of
Loper [sic] could be extended beyond cases in which the right to counsel was
denied. 45 8 The Court's reliance on due process as the basis for holding that
convictions obtained absent the right to counsel were unconstitutional "permits the
argument that procedures violating other rights essential to reliability could also
produce unreliable tainted convictions.
'As9
Prior convictions under Rule 609 are what the Supreme Court would call "non-
testimonial" hearsay, and one might argue that there is a due process requirement that
such evidence be reliable. The Confrontation Clause in the U.S. Constitution, as
recently interpreted by the Supreme Court, places constitutional limitations on the
admissibility of hearsay statements that are "testimonial." The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Crawford v. Washington held that, for Confrontation Clause purposes, if a
hearsay statement is "testimonial," it is inadmissible against a criminal defendant
unless the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, and the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.4 60 Later, in Whorton v. Bockling, the
454. Id.
455. See, e.g., Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1992). The Smith court noted:
[Defendant's] reliance on Loper [was] misplaced. Loper involved convictions
used for impeachment which [sic] were constitutionally invalid because the
accused was denied the right to counsel-a defect which [sic] impairs the very
integrity and reliability of a conviction.... [Defendant's] prior convictions were
invalidated because the indictments contained technical defects. The factual
reliability of his convictions was not questioned.
Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Dahlin, 1998 MT 299, 20, 292 Mont. 49, 20, 971
P.2d 763, 20 ("Here, no prior conviction later determined invalid was introduced into
evidence.... In contrast to the prior convictions at issue in... Loper, Dahlin's testimony has
not been ruled invalid or void .... ).
456. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6140 (2008) (noting Loper's limitations but suggesting that it would be "much more
difficult for the trial judge where the accused had counsel but complains of constitutional error
because of insufficient access to counsel or because counsel was incompetent").
457. Wright and Gold contend that despite limitations currently placed on Loper, it would
not be inappropriate to extend the reliability concern in Loper to other cases where prosecutors
wish to have prior convictions admitted against defendants under Federal Rule of Evidence 609.
Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.").
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Court observed that the Confrontation Clause does not protect against unreliable non-
testimonial hearsay statements. 46'
Thus, some scholars and commentators have raised the question of what
constitutional protections are available for a criminal defendant against whom the State
attempts to introduce unreliable, non-testimonial hearsay. The "straightforward" and
most logical answer is that freestanding due process requires there be sufficient indicia
of reliability for non-testimonial hearsay statements offered against the criminal
defendant.4 62 As one court noted, "[t]here may be some statements so lacking in
reliability that their admission would raise due process concems. ' 3 And in the context
of witness identification evidence, the Supreme Court has indicated that due process
requires that such evidence be reliable. 4
Professor Andrew Taslitz has argued for a "reinvigorated due process analysis [for
hearsay statements], drawing on recent lessons from the innocence movement.'" 5 That
movement focuses on obtaining correct results, which the due process clause is well-
suited to encourage. Indeed, "[d]ue process is meant more than any other constitutional
doctrine to bear the load of encouraging correct results. ... 'A"
A substantial amount of hearsay, including prior judgments of convictions, will be
beyond Crawford's reach, although some of the multiple layers of hearsay that led to
the prior conviction might be deemed testimonial. The ultimate conviction, however,
will be deemed non-testimonial," 7 and thus should be subject to a due process analysis.
And due process, with its promotion of fundamental fairness, is concerned with
reliability.46 "[T]he primary... function of freestanding due process is to promote
reliable fact-finding," that is, that which leads to "measurably accurate outcomes, such
as convicting the killer who wielded the knife and not the innocent bystander falsely
caught in a web of flawed circumstantial evidence." 469 With respect to evidence,
particularly hearsay evidence, "[r]eliability ... can thus be served in at least two ways:
(1) by promoting procedures enhancing the likelihood that admissible evidence
correctly reflects reality; and (2) by improving the fact finder's ability to assess the
accuracy of, and weight to be accorded to, admitted evidence.
' 70
461, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007).
462. See Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a "Get Out of Jail Free" Card for Batterers and
Abusers? An Argumentfor a Narrow Definition of "Testimonial", 84 OR. L. REv. 1093, 1108-
09 (2005).
463. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 n.21 (Mass. 2005); see also United
States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (assuming "that the admission of facially
unreliable hearsay would raise a due process issue").
464. Chase, supra note 462, at 1108-09 (discussing Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977)).
465. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due
Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRim. JuST. 39, 40 (2005).
466. Id.
467. See, e.g., People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (analogizing
prior convictions to business records, which Crawford specifically excluded from the definition
of "testimonial" hearsay).
468. See Taslitz, supra note 465, at 47.
469. Id.
470. Id.
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In addressing a constitutional challenge to Rule 413, which provides for the
admissibility of evidence of a criminal defendant's prior sexual offenses whether
charged or uncharged, the court in United States v. Enjady indicated that without the
"safeguards embodied in Rule 403," Rule 413 would be unconstitutional. 47' The court
"agree[d] that Rule 413 raises a serious constitutional due process issue. ' ' 72 However,
those concerns were adequately safeguarded by the discretion granted to a trial judge
under Rule 403 to exclude evidence where the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 473 The Rule 403 balancing test that
the court outlined, however, was largely concerned with reliability.
474
Rule 609 evidence obtained in a system plagued with racial bias raises serious due
process concerns. And, as I discuss below, a court faced with due process objections
from a defendant to the admission of such evidence should address the reliability issues
surrounding that evidence.
B. Confronting the Inconvenient Truth: A Call for Legislative Action
Many might be resistant to the idea of declaring that prior convictions are unreliable
means of impeachment. Doing so necessarily acknowledges that there are serious flaws
in our criminal system and that those flaws might have caused injustice to a particular
individual. But we cannot ignore the substantial evidence of bias in the system and that
there is injustice that leads to unreliable convictions. Moreover, the idea that a flawed
criminal justice system would compound its failings by making use of unreliable
convictions to produce more unreliable convictions is repugnant.
The criminal justice system--which includes legislators, prosecutors, police,judges,
and even jurors and witnesses-must always seek to improve its accuracy. Doing so
requires that the system be its own toughest critic. Eradicating racial bias in the
criminal process will require careful attention to the ways that race is used as evidence.
Reliance on prior convictions will result in the continuation of the invidious cycle. This
is why impeaching criminal defendants with prior convictions obtained through a
racially biased system perpetuates institutionalized racism.
The evidentiary rules reflect our society's ideals of how best to construct the legal
facsimile of truth. Thus, the rules are a powerful symbol. They model for society the
best way to seek and understand truth. Our rules must change from time to time to
reflect our growth and understanding as a society. The Rape Shield statute is such an
example. Congress and state legislatures should consider the evidence of racial bias in
the criminal justice system, acknowledge the failings in the system, and eliminate the
use of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants.
Though it is my argument that prior convictions are the product of an unreliable
system, I am most concerned about the elimination of their use against criminal
defendants because of the grave potential for prejudice coupled with their low
probative value. I would continue to give courts discretion to allow criminal defendants
to impeach witnesses for the prosecution with their prior convictions in light of
defendants' constitutional right to mount a defense and effectively cross-examine the
471. 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
472. Id. at 1430.
473. Id. at 1433; see also Taslitz, supra note 465, at 48.
474. See Taslitz, supra note 465, at 48.
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witnesses against them. Moreover, in that context, the criminal justice system suffers
the prejudice that might result from the defendants' use of the system's own unreliable
convictions.
C. Challenging "Ancient" Assumptions: A Possible Need for Judicial Intervention
Judges are not in the best position to declare the criminal justice system, in
particular jurisdictions or as a whole, unreliable, because this is more of a political
determination. Still, unless or until Congress addresses the due process concerns with
prior conviction impeachment, judges must intervene in individual cases. In light of
due process concerns, there should be a strong presumption against the admissibility of
prior convictions and a heavy burden against the government to overcome that
presumption. Prior convictions should no longer be "routinely" admitted as a right to
prosecutors.
The burden of establishing admissibility is already on the government-the party
seeking to use the prior conviction. In meeting that burden, courts should require the
prosecution to demonstrate the reliability of the convictions that they offer for
impeachment. The court should consider the race of the defendant and the
incarceration rates based on race and any available studies regarding racial bias in the
particular jurisdiction from which the conviction was obtained. The court should also
consider whether the prior conviction resulted from a plea bargain or was the result of
a full-blown trial. If the conviction was the result of a plea bargain, the court should be
particularly concerned about reliability. Additionally, the court should consider how
the defendant's conviction and his race might work to prejudice him in light of the
facts of the case at hand.
Under the Luck/Gordon doctrine, which preceded Rule 609, but is still relied upon
by courts exercising their discretion under the rule, courts already consider various
nonexclusive factors in balancing the probative value of prior convictions against their
prejudicial effect. 475 These factors include the impeachment value of the conviction,
the point in time of the conviction and the defendant's subsequent history, the
similarity between the prior crime and the current charge, and the centrality of the
credibility issue in the case.476 In Gordon, with respect to plea bargaining, then-Justice
Burger even noted that "[t]he relevance of prior convictions to credibility may well be
different as between a case where the conviction of the accused was by admission of
guilt by a plea and on the other hand a case where the accused affirmatively contested
the charge and testified.. . .,,477 Thus, Burger considered plea-bargaining to be a factor
in determining the probative value of prior convictions.478
My proposal would add factors dealing with racial bias in the criminal process to
the Luck/Gordon analysis. Before admitting the prior conviction against the defendant,
the court should be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a), the
475. See Homstein, supra note 12, at 25 (referring to Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936
(D.C. Cir. 1967) and Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and noting that
courts continue to rely on those cases in determining whether to admit prior convictions).
476. See United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing
United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1185 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc)).
477. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940 n.8.
478. See id.
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rule governing preliminary determinations by the court, that the conviction is
reliable.479
Rule 806 allows parties to attack the credibility of a hearsay declarant, 480 and in the
case of a prior conviction, the criminal justice system is the declarant that has stated
that the defendant is a criminal. Criminal defendants should be able to argue that their
convictions are unreliable. In demonstrating this unreliability, they should be able to
point to any available studies, which may be similar to those discussed in Part III,
showing disproportionate targeting of minorities in theirjurisdiction. They should also
be able to inform the jury of any exoneration in the jurisdiction from which the
conviction was obtained. If the defendant has evidence of racial bias in his case, he
should be able to inform the jury. Similarly, if the defendant has evidence of his actual
innocence, he should be permitted to present it to the jury. Openly discussing race in
this manner will likely help jurors to confront and be mindful oftheir own racial biases.
The obvious criticism of this proposed approach will be the argument often relied
on in other contexts-that this evidentiary issue will spawn a "mini-trial" and that
judicial economy will suffer.48 l Wright and Gold, in arguing that the Loper doctrine
should not be extended much beyond its narrow scope, state that "[e]ngaging in this
[type of] side-trial can be distracting and of little value since the inquiry is pertinent
only to witness credibility. ' '4S2 As discussed above, however, it is widely known that,
practically speaking, the admission of a defendant's prior conviction is quite likely to
have a highly prejudicial impact on the defendant and is of much more importance than
mere "witness credibility." So when considering the dangers of the "side-trial," we
must also consider how powerful this type of evidence is.
And admittedly, there is that potential for a mini-trial. But we permit preliminary
hearings regarding other evidentiary issues, such as Daubert hearings on the reliability
of expert testimony. The requisite initial showing of reliability by the prosecution
would operate in a similar manner. With respect to the defendant's impeachment of the
criminal justice system, I view the possibility of a mini-trial and the sacrifice ofjudicial
economy as necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. If the
prosecution is concerned about judicial economy, there is a simple solution: do not
offer the prior conviction into evidence. They certainly have no constitutional right to
offer this type of evidence. Additionally, the court has tremendous discretion under the
Federal Rules of Evidence to avoid the introduction of irrelevant, cumulative, or
unduly confusing evidence.48 3
479. FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
480. FED. R. EviD. 806.
481. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 456, (arguing that extending Loper beyond its narrow
scope would be "difficult" because "the trial court must conduct an inquiry into the facts of the
underlying case to determine the extent to which there were problems" and that the court must
"conduct what might be [a] complex consideration of the law to determine if the facts raise
constitutional problems").
482. Id.
483. See FED. R. EWD. 403.
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CONCLUSION
While we cannot ignore the progress symbolized by the election of Barack Obama,
we also cannot deny that race remains a significant issue in America, particularly in the
way that justice is served in the criminal process. Race is indeed predictive character
evidence, and it has proven time and time again to be unreliable evidence. As Obama
said of America in his pivotal speech that I referenced in the Introduction of this
Article, the Union "may never be perfect, but... it can always be perfected. ' 484 This
ambitious idea holds true for the criminal justice system as well. In the process of
perfecting the system, we must eliminate racially biased rules such as Rule 609 and
demand evidence of the highest reliability. We must do so even if that means facing the
uncomfortable truth that the American justice system's racial bias has rendered it an
unreliable source of evidence for future cases. Evidence law is about seeking truth
through reliable means. We must not let our past imperfections impede our present
goal of perfecting our truth-seeking process.
484. Obama speech, supra note 3.
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